Friday, July 29, 2005

On CAFTA and So-Called "Free Trade":
(Musings of your humble servant at Rerum Novarum)

I have not discussed this subject very much in recent years because it did not fall into the scope of subjects I wanted to muse on as a rule. However, with the US House and Senate voting to confirm CAFTA, it seems appropriate to revisit some of what I have written on the subject of so-called "free trade" as well as renew my NAFTA predictions for CAFTA. First, some excerpts from the archives:

[So-called "free trade"] is an unfortunate canard of the so-called "neo-conservatives" but even people generally liberal such as Kerry support it. In the case of the liberals, it it is probably because they like the idea of international organizations outside of US sovereignty telling us whom we can trade with and why. The so-called "neo-conservatives" fall for this kind of "voodoo economics" but cannot point to one single example in history where a nation became strong and prosperous due to so-called "free trade" without any recourse to protecting their borders.

The latter constituted the foundation of a challenge I made to some of my business instructors in college who were pro free trade. And despite not being able to answer the challenge, they still uncritically mimicked the "free trade" mantra. My exposing of this canard before the classes I was in -and invariably making my instructors look very bad in the process- probably prevented me from getting the grades I should have gotten in those classes. [Excerpt from Rerum Novarum (circa March 12, 2004)]

The above excerpt was taken from the footnotes of a thread analyzing the voting record of Senator John Kerry and one of the subjects was so-called "free trade." In discussing my ideas for recapitulating the third party concept in a new fashion, one of the reasons I noted to the person I was dialoguing with was the lack of choice on the subject of trade:

Now I am aware that you could argue that at least with two parties (unlike with one party) there is some choice in the matter. However, that can be easily refuted by pointing to boondoggle proposals such as NAFTA: where is the party that gives us an option on so-called "free trade"??? Where is the party that gives us an option on whether or not we take the limits of the Constitution seriously??? Where is the party that gives us an option on protecting the borders as they need to be protected??? You cannot say the Republicans because they are weak on all three of these points and you cannot say the Democrats because they are even worse on them than the Republicans are. [Excerpt from Rerum Novarum (circa November 6, 2004)]

Later, in a followup to that thread, I expanded on the subject a bit in the following words:

[Both parties] promote (to name one example of several) that boondoggle called "free trade" which is a wonderful academic theory that does not work in reality. I challenged three teachers in my international political economy class in college to name for me these countries that built themselves into powerful and industrious nations using the free trade that two of the three were so avidly promoting. And every example they raised I was able to easily shoot down.[...] Despite their failure to cite supporting evidences for this theory, they still shilled for the idea though. Talk about a classic example of economic solipsism in a nutshell!!!

I extend to you the same challenge with this caveat: my teachers who were well schooled in international political economic theory could not do this so do not think that this will be an easy task for you to do. NAFTA and other so-called "free trade" agreements benefit one class of people only: multinational corporations who like to utilize cheap labour for their products. I think it is absurd that these ivory tower nimrods cannot recognize the concoction that is brewed by (i) the strangling tax code in this country coupled with (ii) high regulatory and enviromental restrictions in the US, (iii) no such restrictions to speak of in Mexico, (iv) the ease with which materials can be moved from country to country under this policy, and (v) the dirt cheap non-unionized labour force in places like Mexico which can be exploited. There should be super high tariffs on the products of companies in which the latter go to Mexico or other countries to produce them to ship those same products back to the US for sale. That would mitigate against this pattern but do not expect to see that logical policy implemented anytime soon.[...]

If you want to claim that what we are seeing needs to be refined in its approach, then you would be doing with so-called "free trade" what I am doing with the third party political concept. My opposition was not as much to NAFTA in theory (which sounds good I admit) as what I knew it would result in where the rubber meets the road: indeed I predicted what has come to pass before NAFTA was even implemented. History was my teacher here and those who shilled for NAFTA (including some of my college business and law professors) chose to ignore Santayana's dictum and not listen to what the instructor of history reveals. [Excerpt from Rerum Novarum (circa November 11, 2004)]

The challenge that I made to my professors in college was this:

---Name for me a single country that ever built itself into a strong and prosperous nation using free trade principles.

In retrospect, I should have asked for three to give myself a bit of room but I was less flexible in my approach back then. Nonetheless, I was serendipitously spared when the challenge as worded was not met -and not for lack of trying.

The first answer I was given was "The United States" but that was not true. What the professors tried to argue was that there was free trade between the states and that there was a parallel there which met the criteria I had asked for. I countered this assertion by pointing out that the free trade they referred to was confined to within the union. There was thus not the issue of businesses leaving the nation and taking resources, jobs, etc. with them. For that reason, their example failed because (as I predicted then) businesses would be leaving the United States for Mexico under NAFTA. Furthermore, I predicted that the United States would have no more surpluses with Mexico when the professors and others said the surpluses would grow -and they sought to demonstrate this with various arguments. My counter was essentially as follows:

When you have:

---Draining taxation levels on businesses and mountains of unnecessary regulations in the United States along with high worker wages.

---A scenario where businesses could avoid those draining taxation levels as well as countless regulations (some of which were important and many of which were not) and dirt cheap labour to boot.

Tell me what incentives many companies have to stay in the United States for manufacturing various goods and services???

While many opposed to NAFTA at the time were focusing on the lower wages part of the equation, I took the position that this was wrong-headed and the argument needed to be recast. For businesses were not about to leave the US over lower labour costs if the other factors in the equation (business taxes and regulatory red tape) were dealt with.{1} I also should have noted (if I had thought of it at the time) that the focus on labour as the dividing issue was merely a reassertion of the marxist-socialist myth about there being a necessary adversary relationship between business and labour{2} under the myth of a static or limited economic pie (rather than a dynamic and non-limited one which is the correct approach to take with economics).

The so-called "free traders" were right about the arguments of many who were opposed to NAFTA being weak reed arguments from the standpoint of them being based on the myth of business and labour being necessarily adversarial in their relationships. But the pro-NAFTA crowd was wrong about more than their share too including all of their predictions about NAFTA. And I predict now (as I did in a couple of years before NAFTA went into effect) that the major promoters of CAFTA will again be seriously wrong about its supposed "benefits." But it is not too late to turn the tide here.

Hopefully, someone with common-sense on this issue --and who has not drunk the koolaid of so-called "free trade"-- will intervene and request a full examination of NAFTA and its actual results (compared to what its promoters promised prior to its implementation) before the government of the United States actually seeks to implement CAFTA. However, I am not very optimistic that we will see that happen due to the habitual pattern of Santayana's dictum not being followed much by the so-called "public servants" in Washington DC.

As time is short, I want to leave at this time some articles for further reading and reflection on this matter:

CAFTA: More Bureaucracy, Less Free Trade (Congressman Ron Paul of Texas)

The above is from a pro-Republican site opposed to CAFTA.

CAFTA: Ideology vs. National Interests (Patrick J. Buchanan)

I have noted my reservations about Patrick J. Buchanan before but to remind readers who may have forgotten:

This writer has often noted in the years since he was an avid Buchanan supporter[...] that Patrick J. Buchanan is a streaky kind of writer. I say this in the sense that when he is on, he is quite often not merely on target but indeed en fuego....In closing, though Buchanan is a streaky shooter, as I noted above, when he is on, he tends to get it on the bullseye. [Excerpt from Rerum Novarum (circa August 01, 2004))]

And on CAFTA, Mr. Buchanan gets it right on this subject in so many ways in the opinion of your weblog host.

Notes:

{1} I should note here that I believe businesses should not pay any taxes at all by the way: as those costs are always passed onto the consumer. [Excerpt from Rerum Novarum (circa November 11, 2004)]

{2} As an aside here, this kind of faulty approach to economics issues impairs the majority of Democratic Party adherents and "true believers."

Wednesday, July 27, 2005

Points to Ponder:
(On "Civil Rights")

For a brief clarifying preamble to this post, please see this thread.

"Civil rights" -to define a term that is so commonly misused- are rights which are asserted and therefore are protected by valid law. Such a right can be present in either (i) common law or (ii) local statutes (iii) federal statutes or (iv) the Constitution itself...An assertion that falls within these guidelines is a "civil right" properly so-called. Any usage that does not conform to the above cannot be legitimized under the banner of "civil rights" and any attempts to do so are fraudulent and should be exposed for what they are. [I. Shawn McElhinney: Excerpt from Rerum Novarum (circa December 14, 2002)]
Prefatory Clarification Note:

[Update: This short post was originally thrown together in about a minute's time yesterday. After reviewing it today, it needed to be refined in spots and also expanded a bit; ergo that is what I have done -ISM 7/28/05 10:40am]

It seems appropriate to note briefly for newer readers that I have written in far greater depth and precision on the subject of "rights", "freespeech", and related subjects than in the short extract which will be used in the next posting to this weblog. I have also developed a bit further some elements of a classical theory on liberty by applying to it concepts which were either implied in them previously or which were unknown at the time. This process has been undertaken for easier contemporary discernment for the readers of this weblog between valid and invalid rights in this era of everyone wanting to elevate their pet whims to the status of being a "right" they are supposedly "entitled" to.

What will be noted in the next "points to ponder" installment still has value though despite being less-developed than other things I have written since that time. It shows vividly how ideas can be more implied and then develop over time with additional reflection and analysis being applied to them. If I said now that I anticipated everything that has developed in this area at the present weblog since that time I would not be telling the truth. However, I did have a sketch of an idea where things would go -in part because of the operative presuppositions whereby I approach these kinds of complex issues --particularly the subject of liberty which has been one I have done no small amount of reading on over the years.

Hopefully, as the upcoming supreme court nomination hearings take place, the readers will recall those basic principles properly interpreted of course. (For the latter, I refer you to numerous threads in the side margin of this weblog which explicate on several of the core variables involved.)

With those points in mind, I give you the following "points to ponder" thread...

Tuesday, July 26, 2005

Monday, July 25, 2005

"Extra Ecclesia Nulla Salus" Dept.
(Responding to a Critique)

[Prefatory Note: In doing a brief search for some material to complete another thread about eight weeks ago,{1} I ran across a critique of sorts of one of my essays at what appears to be a Reformed weblog. By interacting with what they had to say at the time, I may have gotten a bit brusque in spots; therefore if the text reads that way to any of you, I apologize in advance. What you are about to read was literally written on the fly in spare moments about seven weeks ago. For that reason, it may have to be refined in spots at a future date if I reread it and think that is warranted. (Not to mention if I can set aside the time to do it should a refining of the text be judged as a good idea.) -ISM]

Colour-wise, the words of the critiquer will be in black firebrick3 font with any sources they used in firebrick 3 font italicized. Any words from my essay as quoted by the critiquer will be in slate blue coloured font. My words in response will be in regular font with any sources in royalblue4 font. Without futher ado, let us get to it...

Cheshire Catholicism

In responding to my charge that the extraordinary magisterium has contradicted itself over time, one of the commentators to my blog said that I should consult the writings of Shawn McElhinney.

It is striking that when challenges to the magisterium come up, we are once again referred to a defense of the magisterium by someone below the magisterium.

Notice the fallacy involved in this kind of argumentation my friends: it is the assumption that any text can be properly understood apart from its sitz im leben. Ascertaining the latter requires a fair amount of study and effort yet many assume that they can dispense with this effort and figure everything out themselves with little to no effort expended in the process.

The reason there are references in these situations to someone below the magisterium is because the magisterium operates under certain presuppositions and those who are so quick to assert that there are "errors" are uniformly unfamiliar with them.{2} It would be akin to arguing about "contradictions" in Newton's Laws of motion without having any familiarity with what Newton wrote or further still: arguing that there are "mathematical errors" in common engineering calculations without knowing basic calculus. The reader is advised to keep this methodological absurdity in mind as they read what this critic has to say because it applies in spades to them whether they realize it or not. But enough on that point and onto interacting with the critique.

But just to make sure that I’ve left no stone unturned, let’s see what McElhinney has to say on the subject.

The most relevant and representative writing of his on the subject at hand appears to be something he wrote in reply to [mr. critic] on the possibility of salvation outside the church.

I have written other stuff subsequent to that work which is in my mind a bit better and more focused on the operative presuppositions involved in the question of salvation outside the church. The latter was not the intention of that essay which was written in late 2001 with a specific purpose in mind. Nonetheless, since that is the work they cite, it is the one which I will focus on in this response.

If this still leaves something important out of consideration, loyal Catholics are more than welcome to draw my attention to whatever I overlooked.

This person's approach to the matter at hand is thus far admirable...as they at least manifest the intention to interact with actual statements of your host rather than with second or third hand inaccurate generalizations. Would that more people were this considerate but I digress.

While infallibility is involved in the universal resolutions of a lawfully ratified Ecumenical Council, this does not mean that the texts of the Council are either verbally inspired or that they necessarily state a teaching in the best possible way.

1.Notice that McElhinney has already tipped his hand. He is going to defend the consistency of magisterial teaching by driving a wedge between the infallible resolutions of an ecumenical council, and the text of the council, which is not necessarily (?) verbally inspired or phrased in the best possible way.

No, my intention was to point out that a truth can be stated using language that is not necessarily the best way to assert it. Times and circumstances often dictate the approach taken in explaining something and the reunion of the Churches at Florence involved some pretty strong and (what would appear to be) uncompromising language. For those who do not read what was written with an understanding of the times, circumstances, and assumptions of the time period, there is bound to be misunderstandings of the inner dynamics involved -particularly when one fails to understand general norms of theological interpretation as this person cannot help but do.

2.One wonders how he is able to extract the infallible resolutions from the fallible text of the resolutions. What is our source of information regarding the resolutions if not the text of the resolutions? Note, he applies this to the autographa, not the copies.

Again, this involves understanding general norms of interpretation. What is infallible is the definition itself, not necessarily the exposition involved to arrive at the definition. It is solemn dogma that outside the church there is no salvation. The problem is, when one does not understand the context in which that expression was understood from time immemorial, they are not understanding the dogma properly. The expression was always understood in a Christocentric sense not an Ecclesiocentric one. Those who do not take this into account are inexorably going to have serious misunderstandings on the issue as a result.

Furthermore, there is the entire subject of infallibility which is frankly too advanced for those who do not understand more basic principles of ecclesiology. Infallibility is not the criterion for the truth or irreformability of a given teaching. It is more an exercise for theologians since infallibility is more broadly based than most people would casually presume. But as that is to go off on another tangent completely, let us return to the comments being interacted with.

3.Likewise, how do we separate the infallible resolutions from the actual wording of the resolutions?

Again, this is an exercise for theologians primarily. There are certain principles of interpretation which are followed but to discuss that kind of "theological calculus" with those who do not know basic "theological algebra" will not get us anywhere. The most basic distinction though is between what must be believed (dogma) or held (doctrine) and what must be done. The latter has two elements to it, matters of morals (dogma/doctrine) and matters of ecclesiastical discipline.{3} Often prior to the Council of Trent, these were dealt with side by side and (admittedly) it is not always apparent at first glance where something is properly classified. But usually someone with a bit of study of general norms can classify most stuff pretty quickly. Sometimes there is a more complex issue where you have alterations in underlying variables (which require an alteration in the application of certain principles to maintain continuity) but those are not too frequent fortunately. But enough on that and back to the interaction.

4. Assuming, for the sake of argument, that his disjunction is valid, it preserves the authority of the magisterium in the abstract by sacrificing the authority of the magisterium in the concrete. For even when an ecumenical council has spoken, there remains an indefinable area of uncertainty.

No ecumenical council (or papal statement) is ever supposed to be taken by itself apart from what has been said previously. (To do this is to pull too hard on one strand and unravel the proverbial "cloak".) Ecumenical councils are usually called for a specific reason and they direct their efforts at those reasons and those reasons alone. Sometimes this approach can lead to certain areas of uncertainty which future councils (or future statements by the popes) seek to clarify as it seems opportune to do. Why this is at all surprising is a mystery to me unless it is an attempted extension of a form of the sola scriptura principle being applied by this person to the Catholic magisterium. And if the latter is the case, then the person in question is involved in the logical fallacy of context-switching which involves the fallacy of arguing from questionable premises. But back to the dialogue in question...

So we’re left with the question, where do you find the mind of the true church?

For those who accept the authority of the Church's magisterium, you find it there. The problem is, this person seems to presume that every statement of the Church's magisterium is all-encompassing. As I have already covered the problem with this approach, I will not belabour it further here.

There is also the element to interpretation known as the sitz im leben.

This is a valid principle.

Thankyou.

So why does he not apply it to the above disclaimer?

I am at a loss to know which disclaimer he is referring to.

Does Florence itself include a disclaimer to that effect?

We can see shades of a kind of sola scriptura principle being misapplied here in the idea that Florence must be interpreted solely by what they say and nothing more...as if words themselves can be understood in a vacuum apart from (i) the particular circumstances that occasioned their drafting, (ii) the presuppositions that were behind said words, (iii) the time which they were written with, and (iv) the accompanying conventions of the age. Failing to take these matters into account is to engage in the logical fallacy of anachronism.

Is there any evidence from this general period or before that when an ecumenical council has spoken, this left room for a disjunction between its universal resolutions and the text or wording of is resolutions?

The questions that need to asked are these:

---Is there any reasonable premise from which we can assume that every ecumenical council says everything perfectly or in language that always retains the exact same meaning in every time and place when many aspects that impact said words undergo changes (sometimes rapidly so) over time???

---Is it unreasonable to presume that there are differences in times, circumstances, and operative presuppositions which can (and usually do) fluxuate from age to age that will affect the proper understanding of a text by those who read them in a later age if the latter are not aware of said distinctions at the outset of any attempt to interpret correctly said texts???

The correct responses to those questions are as follows: no for the first and yes for the second.{4}

Ecumenical councils are believed to be protected from error by the Holy Spirit but that does not mean that their pronouncements are always said in the best possible way. For example, I could refer to the person I am dialoguing with as a "schismatic from the true church" who will "go into everlasting fire" unless "before he dies, he repents" and (from these inferences) imply a willful separation from the ecclesiastical body by this person. Or, I could recognize the principle that one who errs does not necessarily do so in bad faith. In the latter instances, the Catholic tradition has always recognized that God will not punish such people for erring if they were unable to remove the obstacles to their error with an ordinary use of due diligence.

When the reader recognizes that (i) Florence was a reunion council operating from the former presumption and (ii) Vatican II was a council seeking reunion which operated from both the former and the latter presumptions taken together, this is not difficult for those of good faith to understand. In summary, the contexts were different; ergo one must take this into account if they are to interpret them correctly.

Does such a disjunction comport with original intent?

This goes into the subject of foundational presuppositions. The purpose of my essay was to point out certain operative presumptions common for the period preceding Florence to better situate Florence's statements within their sitz im leben. The intention was also to point out that common interpretations of Florence are based on the reader's own presuppositions of what given words or phrases mean and that this is not necessarily the same as what they actually mean.

People who argue as this person does have many of these unacknowledged presuppositions in their respective weltanschauungs. One of the intentions of that essay was to point to many of them as a way of helping people see that there is greater complexity to this issue than certain polemical persons who approach these things in a facile manner (as the "Mr. Critic" referred to in that essay) so frequently do.

I would not presume a priori that the person I am responding to here has the same motivations as the aforementioned person -of whom I base my judgment of on both personal interactions as well as manifested habitual tendencies established by past hermeneutical patterns in their approach to Catholic issues. Instead, I will allow any future statements on the content of this response from the person being responded to to begin establishing the pattern whereby I will view their sincerity (or lack of it) in seeking to understand these issues as Catholics understand them.

McElhinney then quotes from the council, beginning “It firmly believes, professes, and proclaims that those not living within the Catholic Church, not only pagans, but also Jews and heretics and schismatics cannot become participants in eternal life.”

Correct.

This is followed by his own gloss:

Again, my friends, this person errs by presuming that a proper understanding of terms and expressions stand alone in a vacuum. This is a serious exegetical error on their part as well as a serious fallacy in argumentation.{5} The problems with this kind of methodology have already been noted by me in this response so I will not repeat them here except to note them again briefly. That way, the reader can see the rabbit trail before being led down it by the person whose writing we are interacting with.

[T]he statement above was specifically directed towards the Apostolic churches which were re-aligning themselves with Rome in the fifteenth century. Those Apostolic churches who (seeking reunification with Rome) knew of the necessity of union with Rome for salvation. In this context, the decree from the Council of Florence must be assessed because otherwise it is not being properly understood.

Those are my words, yes. (As an aside, I thank the person for at least quoting me accurately: that is something that can never be taken for granted unfortunately.)

How does this have the least bearing on the conciliar statement?

Simple, it contextualizes certain presuppositions which the statement was based on. Again, we all come to any source with certain presuppositions. Further still, we all (to some extent) impose those presuppositions on what we interact with even when we believe we are not doing it. This person presumes a lot in their interpretation of the Council text which they do not disclose to their readers...and much of which they may not even be consciously aware of.

Although that statement was addressed to those who supposedly “knew of the necessity of union with Rome for salvation,” it is a statement about many of those who did not know or acknowledge any such necessity, viz., pagans, Jews, heretics, schismatics.

Once again, the person I am interacting with ignores a key presupposition that informs Catholic thinking on these matters: the principle of formal and material error. As the Catholic tradition has always distinguished between formal and material error, the reader then needs to ask if in the context of this pronouncement (i.e the reunion of an individual Church with the Roman Church) the circumstances point to a condemnation of those materially in error or formally so. But to do this is to turn over another presuppositional stone which the person I am interacting with does not acknowledge: the subject of freewill.

The very reason we distinguish in the Catholic tradition between formal and material error{6} is because we recognize the principle of freewill in the equation. But as our Reformed friend does not, that is a significant problem (from the Catholic standpoint) with their view on this matter. It also explains perhaps why they do not properly comprehend Florence.

And it specifically says that they are damned “unless before the end of life the same have been added to the flock.”

Yes it does but how must they be added to the flock to be saved??? The text does not say and the reader cannot merely impose onto the text their own interpretation to attempt to conform to their particular agenda. That would not be an honest thing to do. However, I would wager that this person is unconsciously doing just that.

So even though the scope of the audience is quite narrow, the scope of the referent—of those outside the pale of salvation—is extremely broad.

The interpretation that this person offers can only be arrived at by (i) not interpreting Florence in the context of the entirety of Catholic tradition -including certain key presuppositions that are imperative for right understanding and (ii) imposing without warrant one's own interpretation onto the words or concepts in question rather than seeking to find out what the magisterium -in light of the entirety of the Catholic tradition- means by such expressions.

There is also the fact that the statement itself, while definitive, is not formally so. (Instead it is definitive statement because it was reiterating the dogma extra ecclesia nulla salus as previously defined by Lateran IV and particularly by Pope Boniface VIII in the Apostolic Letter Unam Sanctum.) In that sense the exposition element of the teaching would not necessarily fall under the mantle of infallible teaching - particularly since this Decree was to a particular church and not one promulgated to the universal church either expressly or tacitly.

1.What does it mean to say that such an exposition “would not necessarily fall under the mantle of infallibility?”

Simple, the exposition was directed at a particular church and not the universal church. The core doctrine of the pronouncement ("no salvation outside the church") was already defined so reiteration of it in this decree would also be infallible in its essential import. But that does not necessarily mean that any additional expository statements on the matter in said decree would be infallible -the inability of many people to properly understand them notwithstanding of course. Infallibility applies to the universal church not necessarily to particular churches. And because this decree was to a particular church, its injunctions apply to that particular church and not to all churches indiscriminately.

What are the criteria for arriving at this determination?

Now we get more questions. Hopefully the reader can see why it is always easier to ask questions than to answer them. And by asking for "the criteria" when this person has evinced no familiarity with what we have covered so far, hopefully the reader will excuse me for not spilling more type on this subject. One must learn basic algebra before they try to tackle calculus or linear math. The same principle applies to theology or any other discipline one seeks to study -be they scholastic in their import or not.

Do these criteria date from the time of the council itself (the sitz-im-leben)? Are they magisterial criteria? Has the magisterium ever applied these criteria to the document in question? Or are these riders and waivers being raised after-the-fact, as a face-saving device?

Notice the implications involved here: the person in question presumes that any statements after the fact must necessarily be "face saving device[s]" rather than an honest attempt to clarify (for those who misunderstood them) certain conventions of a particular time period used in a particular way which are misunderstood in subsequent times. These potential misunderstandings could be due to (i) a change in either the presuppositions or particular circumstances which informed the previous statements, (ii) using different expressions at a later date to signify the same point in a better way, (iii) differing presuppositions from which some approach the text in question, or (iv) any combination of the latter three. Again we see a resurfacing of a form of the sola scriptura paradigmatic approach applied to the magisterium by this person's arguments.

2. Here we have a declaration by one ecumenical council, which reaffirms a declaration by another ecumenical council, which reaffirms an “Apostolic letter” by a medieval pope.

Correct.

Yet McElhinney says that there is still this cloud of uncertainty surrounding the precise force of the conciliar statement.

No, what I said was that there is a lot of confusion on the part of people uninformed of the broader Catholic tradition as to how the statement is to be properly understood.

Isn’t this a losing proposition either way you take it?

No.

If, on the one hand, the statement is authoritative, then you have a contradiction between Florence and Vatican II.

No you do not necessarily have a contradiction. The only way one can arrive at this position is to neglect a number of things I have already mentioned including interpreting the statement within the context of the totality of the Catholic tradition: an exercise that has many additional corollary presuppositions inherent to it. I pointed out many of these things in that essay. Apparently this person did not take the time to consider them before responding to that writing.

But if, on the other hand, the statement is not authoritative, then you can never know when the RCC speaks authoritatively—for even when the pope has spoken, and his statement is reaffirmed by two ecumenical councils, that doesn’t settle the issue once and for all.

It settles the issue for those who understand the passages correctly. This person seems to forget that ecumenical councils always involve Council Fathers and also theologians (sometimes they are one and the same) and that these people utilize general principles in formulating the statements made and do so in line with the realities of the time. But even in doing this, there are a lot of presuppositions within the broader tradition that are assumed a priori by said theologians and Council Fathers which inform the manifested intention of a given statement viz. how it is properly understood.

Again, no one has a tabula rasa on these or any other matters. The reader is asked to notice though that this is how the person in question seeks to approach Florence: as it there is nothing else that affects how what Florence says is properly understood. But Catholics do not see it that way -or at least properly informed ones do not. And in explaining the various principles involved in properly understanding magisterial pronouncements (if such explanation is necessary) has historically been the role of the theologian in the Church.

The role of theologians historically has been to explain where necessary the various principles involved in magisterial pronouncements because average people do not grasp them anymore than someone who cannot write numbers properly grasps how to do basic mathematics. So again, for those who understand the principles properly, the pronouncements settle the issues they intend to settle.

However, there are many contingent variables that may impact how a particular teaching is applied. If these kinds of contingent variables change, then the magisterium may have to establish a different policy to insure continuity with the one previously utilized. The long and short of it is this: the issues involved here are far more complex than the person I am interacting with appears to comprehend.

A Catholic apologist can only save the reputation of his church by turning his church into a moving target.

Translation: there must necessarily be errors involved because this person is simply incapable of misunderstanding what they read. Furthermore, it is impossible for theological issues to have any complexity to them whatsoever. Instead, those who attempt to explain that there are contingent complexities (and highlight what they are) are actually "dupes" who have to "salvage the reputation of their church" because "their church" of course always takes the most simplistic approach to everything which then requires a bunch of "apologists" to utilize a "spinning" of the "obvious errors" that are involved. And anyone who reads the various texts can see this even if they have no theological knowledge whatsoever. And the band plays on...

Hopefully the reader recognizes the profoundly facile operative viewpoint that this person's statements inexorably involve.

But, in that event, universal skepticism reigns supreme.

See my previous comments.

3. What is the value of a General or Ecumenical council which has no more force than a local or particular council?

Who says that Florence has no more force than a particular synod??? I certainly never did. However (here comes the complexity aspect again) not all sessions of Florence carry the same authoritative weight. Some of Florence was a convocation (either de facto or de iure) of the universal church. Others were sessions which sought to reunite a particular church with the universal church and (in the case of the latter) sometimes certain prescriptions of a more local nature were applied to the particular church in question. The latter was the case with the decrees to the Copts and Armenians which were promulgated in the form of papal Bulls by Pope Eugenius IV.

4. Why is infallibility such an elusive property, anyway?

Infallibility is a far more organic constituent of the universal church than most people realize. It is also a very complex subject to discuss and (frankly) is not what the focus should be on. The focus instead should be on authority and who in the Church (if anyone) has it and (of those who do) under what circumstances is it applicable. Again, infallibility is (i) not the criteria which determines whether or not a given teaching is true or not nor (ii) whether a particular directive is irreformable or not.

Is it a rare and nonrenewable resource which must be meted out with an eyedropper lest the church use up her limited stock of infallibility in the first few centuries, and have none left for the remainder of the church age?

No.

Was Florence running low on infallibility?

No.

Was it in danger of running out before the session ended?

No.

This is not a principled distinction, but a polemical distinction—a makeshift distinction concocted by an institution or apologist to save appearances.

See what I noted above about the manner whereby the person in question is approaching these issues.

Those who are not culpably aware of their obligations within this realm were not the intended target of this decree.

Which target? The target audience? No, they are not the target audience.

I already said that.

But they are the referent. Although the decree was written to a particular audience, it is not written about a particular audience.

In some respects it is, in other respects it is not. The failure of this person to recognize (at least in the abstract) the possibility of certain distinctions existing which correctly contextualize a given pronouncement is problematical to no small degree.

After all, if it was only concerned with the target audience, it did not need to talk about pagans and Jews, did it? For it was not pagans and Jews who were seeking reunion with Rome. So the decree goes out of its way to target a much larger swath of humanity. That’s the context.

Again, they do not understand the sitz im leben. The Copts were living in an area which was dominated by Muslims and which had a very large (and influential) Jewish population. The Muslims were capable to influencing them militarily to apostasize and the Alexandrian Jews were capable of influencing them to apostasize through their high degree of intelligence and erudition. The Fathers still present at Florence{7} wanted to place the strongest possible stamp on the reunion decree by reminding them that those who apostasized into either Islam or Judaism could not be saved nor could schismatics. (In doing this, the council placed very stringent disciplines on the Coptic and Armenian churches.) With regards to the subject of schismatics, it helps to remember that the Copts were recognized as formal schismatics prior to the attempted reunion.

The long and short of it is that none of those statements were intended to apply to every Muslim, every Jew, or every schismatic irrespective of particular circumstances.{8} Notice again what happens when the person in question focuses only on the words themselves and not on the various other factors which set the proper presuppositional base in place to properly interpret the words. This is another functional application of the person's overriding sola scriptura approach to the Catholic magisterium's statements.

Removing one small sentence from a Bull several pages in length and divorced from the time period and target audience guarantees an error in proper interpretation because the sitz im leben would be undermined.

This is a misrepresentation of the charge.

No it is not.

You have the papal statement followed by the conciliar statement followed by another conciliar statement. So this is not an isolated sentiment. There is a pattern here.

Yes, there is a pattern here. However, it is a pattern which is only properly understood by those who are familiar with the various components that go into a proper understanding of the Catholic view.

To fortify the earlier contextual placing of the Decrees of Florence, some work from the late great catechist Fr. John Hardon will be referenced:

Alongside this strong insistence on the need for belonging to the Church was another Tradition from the earliest times that is less well known… they also had the biblical narrative of the "pagan" Cornelius who, the Acts tell us, was "an upright and God-fearing man" even before baptism. Gradually, therefore, as it became clear that there were "God-fearing" people outside the Christian fold, and that some were deprived of their Catholic heritage without fault on their part, the parallel Tradition arose of considering such people open to salvation, although they were not professed Catholics or even necessarily baptized. Ambrose and Augustine paved the way for making these distinctions. By the twelfth century, it was widely assumed that a person can be saved if some "invincible obstacle stands in the way" of his baptism and entrance into the Church. In other words, this was the operating assumption of the Council of Florence when restating the dogma of faith on the necessity of the Church for salvation at Florence… Thomas Aquinas restated the constant teaching about the general necessity of the Church. But he also conceded that a person may be saved extra sacramentally by a baptism of desire and therefore without actual membership by reason of his at least implicit desire to belong to the Church.

1.After having drawn all those hair-splitting distinctions about the target-audience and a decree which is definitive, “but not formally so,” suddenly all that is cast to the winds and we are treated to the private opinions of miscellaneous theologians, as though an ecumenical council does not speak formally and universally, but an individual theologian does. The instant descent into special-pleading could not be more conspicuous.

The only "special-pleading" here is the person in question refusing to consider the manifold elements that go into a proper understanding of Florence. Again, the council's decrees were not pronounced into a vacuum; ergo striving to interpret them that way is to guarantee an error in one's interpretation. Hopefully if I reiterate this point enough, it will finally sink in.

For example, Aquinas also believed that there were circumstances under which a priest could break the seal of the confessional. But that did not become Catholic dogma.

This is correct. Not everything Aquinas said was a matter of dogma or doctrine. But he is probably the best theologian for ascertaining the manifested mind of the magisterium on most issues...so much so that you can take anything Aquinas says and have the benefit of the doubt if you are uncertain. That is the reason why the Popes have repeatedly proclaimed him as the Church's premier theologian and recommended his methodology as being pre-eminent among all the Fathers and Doctors of the Church.

This has borne itself out in history with every council after Aquinas' time (particularly Trent but also Florence) drawing heavily on the Summa Theologiae as a source in their magisterial formulations. It also bears out in at least twenty-five popes since 1274 (and not a few when Aquinas was still living) who have given him tributes surpassing those of anyone who has arisen in the Church since the death of the last Apostle.

Though he was among the first to attempt a systemization to the concept, the principle of "invincible ignorance" already had a long pedigree in the Church's theological tradition. The Fathers of Florence were certainly not ignorant of the principle by any means -however this person opines that they were. However, the Fathers of Florence were not focused on those kinds of people in their formulations because of the circumstances they were facing at the time; ergo it did not factor into their deliberations and statements explicitly. A proper understanding of Florence means taking these presuppositions into account when reading the texts themselves. And for that reason, if one excludes these presuppositions when reading Florence, they will not understand the latter correctly.

It is an easy matter to quote the church fathers on both sides of the issue. For example, one can just as well cite St. Augustine against the baptism of desire: “And how many sincere catechumens die unbaptized and are lost forever!" (Augustine the Bishop, Van Der Meer, p.150),”

Anyone can prooftext. How do we know if this is an intended statement of doctrine or a rhetorical rejoinder??? By what this person cites we do not know. But those familiar with the corpus of Augustine's work do know that Augustine viewed the church primarily as a sacrament which is the very operative principle whereby the doctrine of "baptism of desire" was formulated.{9} And Augustine quite clearly enunciated this principle in his polemic against the Donatists. You can prooftext Augustine to prove anything; however, with more ample citations (as I will provide) this is not so easy to do. Observe:

Certainly it is clear that, when we speak of within and without in relation to the Church, it is the position of the heart that we must consider, not that of the body, since all who are within in heart are saved in the unity of the ark through the same water, through which all who are in heart without, whether they are also in body without or not, die as enemies of unity. [S. Augustinus, Bapt. c. Donat. V, 39]

I doubt you will accuse St. Augustine of "splitting hairs" though he makes no different distinction than I and others (whom you have claimed are splitting hairs) do.

I’d add that, to my knowledge, the baptism of desire was never “formally” defined by the church.

It was not formally defined if by that you mean dogma. But it was declared as a matter of doctrine by the Council of Trent in the Decree on Justification from Session VI on the basis of being a long-held principle of the church at large (as Fr. Hardon noted in the work I cited in my essay).

And even if you treat it as solemn dogma, that does not justify its extension to those outside the Catholic faith:

In its proper meaning, this consists of an act of perfect contrition or perfect love [that is Charity, which necessarily implies that one has the True Faith], and the simultaneous desire for baptism. It does not imprint an indelible character on the soul and the obligation to receive Baptism by water remains. [R. Broderick, The Catholic Concise Encyclopedia (1957), 126. Imprimatur by Francis Cardinal Spellman.]

Again, to discuss this subject correctly involves understanding various other principles of Catholic understanding. You cannot quote a source and understand it correctly without recognizing the coordinate principles involved. The Church has always recognized that one can err in good faith and such a person is not necessarily blameworthy for their error. Furthermore, the Church has always recognized that one is bound to follow their conscience even if the latter is erroneous: one who does this without a formally heretical or formally schismatic mentality is not held as liable for their error. And this principle was a given in Catholic theology long before Florence was convoked: precisely why I referenced St. Thomas Aquinas in my essay on salvation outside the church (and Fr. John Hardon referencing St. Thomas on this subject). But that is not all.

For ultimately, all of this returns to the subject of freewill which this Reformed Protestant denies. But even if they deny the existence of freewill, they should recognize that Catholics affirm that principle along with many others which are connected with various dogmas and doctrines by corollary extension. Therefore, any attempt they make to understand Catholic teaching on any subject should strive to account for as many of these interlocking principles as they can discern. Otherwise, they will never understand what they are reading when they seek to understand such things as the decrees of Florence.

2. And notice, to, the huge leaps in logic. Was Cornelius saved because he didn’t know any better? No.

This is a falsification of my position. I have never claimed that anyone is saved because they [do not] know better."

He was saved by believing the Gospel. He was not saved as a pagan qua pagan, but, at most, as a pagan qua convert.

This is speculation. The text according to the KJV tells us that [t]here was a certain man in Caesarea called Cornelius, a centurion of the band called the Italian [band], [A] devout [man], and one that feared God with all his house, which gave much alms to the people, and prayed to God always. [Acts x,1-2]

Indeed, Cornelius was not a pagan. He was a God-fearer in the technical sense of Gentile worshipper of the God of Israel.

Who is really placing an interpretation onto the Cornelius situation to attempt to "salvage their [theology]" I wonder??? ;-) One could fear God adequately without being one of the Gentile God-fearers this person refers to. Peter certainly had a broader view on this than they do:

Then Peter opened [his] mouth, and said, Of a truth I perceive that God is no respecter of persons: But in every nation he that feareth him, and worketh righteousness, is accepted with him. [Acts x,34-35]

The principle behind the Church's understanding of such things as "invincible ignorance" is what St. Paul notes in Romans ii about those who though they have not the law being justified if they do what the law prescribed:

[N]ot the hearers of the law [are] just before God, but the doers of the law shall be justified. For when the Gentiles, which have not the law, do by nature the things contained in the law, these, having not the law, are a law unto themselves: Which shew the work of the law written in their hearts, their conscience also bearing witness, and [their] thoughts the mean while accusing or else excusing one another; In the day when God shall judge the secrets of men by Jesus Christ according to my gospel. [Romans ii,13-16]

And again:

For circumcision verily profiteth, if thou keep the law: but if thou be a breaker of the law, thy circumcision is made uncircumcision. Therefore if the uncircumcision keep the righteousness of the law, shall not his uncircumcision be counted for circumcision? And shall not uncircumcision which is by nature, if it fulfil the law, judge thee, who by the letter and circumcision dost transgress the law? For he is not a Jew, which is one outwardly; neither [is that] circumcision, which is outward in the flesh: But he [is] a Jew, which is one inwardly; and circumcision [is that] of the heart, in the spirit, [and] not in the letter; whose praise [is] not of men, but of God. [Romans ii,25ff]

That is the essence of Catholic teaching on no salvation outside the church in a nutshell...and Florence must be interpreted in that sense to be properly understood.{10}

3. “Widely assumed.” “The operating assumption” of Florence. All Harden and McElhinney are doing here is to assume that it was assumed at Florence. They are not going by what Florence actually says, but by something that Florence never says. Indeed, what Florence actually says runs counter to what they assume it was assuming all along.

Again, this person is not considering the multitude of other factors that must be included in the equation to properly understand Florence. I have already noted this many times and do not intend to expound upon it in more detail at the present time.

4. But let us play along with the logic of their claim. About 99% of the pagan world was in no position to know about the claims of Rome. By that rough estimate, about 99% of pagans were invincibly ignorant. So 99% of pagans are actually exempt from the exclusionary formula.

One is not merely in a position of invincible ignorance by virtue of not knowing. There are those who sought the truth and adhered to it as best they knew it...and did not consciously set up roadblocks to better comprehension of the truth in the process. Those would be rightfully considered invincibly ignorant and I personally doubt they would approach the fiftieth percentile let alone the hundreth that you propose.{11} But I even hesitate to put out any kind of a number like that because we are not in any position to know with certainly the hearts of another. And the Church has always recognized this, even at Florence. However, we are in a position to know with the greatest of certainty who those people are who are with the greatest likelihood within the Church. They are viewed of course as the ones who recognize and adhere to what the Church teaches as doctrine and prescribes as discipline. The Second Vatican Council explained it in the following words:

They are fully incorporated in the society of the Church who, possessing the Spirit of Christ accept her entire system and all the means of salvation given to her, and are united with her as part of her visible bodily structure and through her with Christ, who rules her through the Supreme Pontiff and the bishops. The bonds which bind men to the Church in a visible way are profession of faith, the sacraments, and ecclesiastical government and communion. [Second Vatican Ecumenical Council: Dogmatic Constitution Lumen Gentium §14 (c. 1964)]

Prior to this statement, the dogma "no salvation outside the church" was noted as it pertained to the Catholic faithful. I am hesitant to say any more than that because this is not a simple concept and I do not want this response being unduly long.

So when Florence tells us “it firmly believes, professes, and proclaims that those not living within the Catholic Church, not only pagans, but also Jews and heretics and schismatics cannot become participants in eternal life,” we have to read between the lines.

This person's reading is flawed. First of all, they have not defined what "living within the Catholic Church" is. They instead assume a particular interpretation of that passage without warrant for doing so.

To paraphrase it according to Harden and McElhinney, what Florence really meant to say was: “it firmly believes, professes, and proclaims that those not living within the Catholic Church, not only pagans, but also Jews and heretics and schismatics cannot become participants in eternal life—excepting, of course, for the 99% of the heathen who can become participants in eternal life.”

See my previous two comments.

We can quibble over the exact percentiles if you like. I’ll cede you 2% or 5% or 10%. Makes no difference. To suppose that Florence is actually making allowance for the vast majority of pagans who ever lived and died doesn’t strike me as a plausible assumption. But I’ll leave the reader to draw his own conclusions.

I will leave the reader to consider what I have noted in this post (as well as what this person noted) to draw their own conclusions too.

5. And there are two additional difficulties: first of all, note the adversative construction: “not only pagans, but also Jews and heretics and schismatics.”

It goes from those who know the least to those who know the most—from those with the least contact to those with the most.

Yes it does.

Now, is this adversative construction saying that ignorance is an attenuating or exculpable circumstance? Quite the contrary!

If you read the context of the entire Bull it is clear that the Council in recapitulating the various heresies is presuming as a matter of course that those it mentions are formally culpable in a corporate sense.{12} But there is no reason to presume that this would apply to an individual sense in light of the other principles I have already mentioned which must accompany a proper interpretation of Florence's statements.

It is saying that even if you’re in a position to know much more—even if you’re a mere schismatic, which is the least culpable category, you are still damned. So the actually wording of the statement treats ascending degrees of ignorance as an aggravating rather than a mitigating circumstance, much less exculpatory.

Again, with those involved in a reunion synod who know what is expected of them there is no excuse. The same is not the case with those who do not have this understanding. It is not an issue of them being excused for [not] know[ing] better" but instead it is properly understood in light of what St. Paul noted in Romans ii.

6.Finally, what Harden and McElhinney are doing here is to harmonize one magisterial contradiction by invoking yet another magisterial contradiction. What about the parallel tradition of the invincibly ignorant?

Notice that again this person presumes "magisterial contradiction" when they have not given any hints whatsoever that they even understand Catholic theology 101.

The presupposition of the exclusionary formula is that saving grace is sacramental grace. God has channeled his saving grace through the means of grace. And only the true church, by virtue of apostolic succession, has access to valid sacraments.

This is true as a rule; however, there is a principle that requires remembering with regards to the sacraments and it is this: we know the sacraments are certain as channels of grace but God is not bound to the sacraments alone to dispense with His grace. Or to put it more succinctly: we are bound to the sacraments (by divine precept) but God is not.

Beyond the distinction between valid and invalid sacraments, a further distinction was drawn between valid and irregular sacraments in the case of those who retain a sufficient affiliation with true church that, although alienated from her communion, still had valid sacraments. As McElhinney himself puts it:

[We] know with certainty where the Church is; we are without certainty as to where the Church is not. When churches and ecclesial communities broke away from the one, true church, they cannot help but take doctrines and certain rites with them, and many, to this day, still retain their efficacy. Obviously the degree of grace in each situation differs somewhat. For example, where there is still a valid priesthood all the Fountains of Grace (Sacraments) are available. If Apostolic Succession is lacking, there is still the valid Rite of Baptism. And even where the Rite of Baptism is denied, there is still the Holy Scriptures, which can excite in the believer a love for Our Lord and a longing to be a member of His Body the Church. All of these gifts, as the Second Vatican Council taught, come from the one Church of Christ and receive their efficacy from her.

Yes, that is what I said. (Again I appreciate being cited correctly.)

There is, indeed, a certain logic to this exception—if you grant the premise. But that very logic cuts against extending the grace of God to those with absolutely no such corporate connection to the visible church.

The Catholic Church does not give any definites in this area. Instead, she recognizes that grace is not confined to the visible church only. As a Reformed Protestant, this person should be pleased with such an admission. But they seem to want it both ways: to have the Catholic Church declare that non-Catholic Christians without a corporate connection to the visible church can benefit from God's grace but non-Christians without a corporate connection to the visible church cannot. The Church adamantly refuses to do this. Indeed, there has been a trend since the Council of Trent whereby the magisterium has frequently condemned the theological propositions of those who attempted to place such restrictions on God's grace.

For a Catholic to say that Muslims and Jews and Hindus and Buddhists can be saved is to decouple saving grace from the means of grace—in which case the priesthood is superfluous.

The Catholic Church teaches that the fullness of truth subsists in that Church which is united in societal form under the Pope and the episcopate united with him (cf. Lumen Gentium §8). From there, it exists in various forms or gradations downward from actual Churches (i.e. the Orthodox) to ecclesial communities (i.e. various Protestant denominations), to non-Christian communities (foremost among them the Jews followed by the Muslims) and then to the polytheists. Every manifestation of religion has some of the truth which subsists in the Catholic Church and exists in other Churches and communities in proportion to their proximity to the Catholic faith. None of this makes the priesthood superfluous.

The person whose post I am responding to here seems to believe that if they admit that something is possible that they must thereby admit that it is probable. The two do not go hand in hand by any means. The priesthood is not superfluous by any means because what is celebrated on our altars is (we believe) the very One who offered Himself at the Last Supper and (after that) was scourged, crucified, died, rose again, ascended to the Father, and unto the end of time lives to make intercession for us. And as Catholics believe that the ministerial priesthood{13} is essential for the application of the fruits of the Passion and death of Christ to all people, it is not possible for the ministerial priesthood to become superfluous on this side of the eschaton.

Because Catholic tradition is so very diverse, you can always quote from something in early Catholic tradition to support later Catholic tradition, but that does nothing to harmonize the diversity itself.

What is the problem with theological diversity??? This idea that diversity in approaches must mean a contradiction in principles is a false dichotomy which the person we are interacting with presupposes without warrant.

Rather, it gives you parallel traditions with linear consistency and horizontal inconsistency.

Again, just because something looks contrary at first glance...or even second or third glance...does not mean that it is. Catholic theology always has (and always will) struggle with expressing in words the mystery of the Church. In some respects it transcends what we can say about it...but that does not mean that apparently contrary views (i.e. predestination and freewill) are actually contrary.

Each individual tradition may have a certain inner consistency, but be inconsistent with a parallel tradition.

On the surface sure. A lot of these truths require a good deal of study and also prayer. And the utilitarianist habit of reducing everything to what is emperically verifiable also needs to be avoided if this person hopes to properly understand the dynamics involved in complex theological matters.

McElhinney later quotes from Pius IX and Pius X.

Correct.

But while these may reflect a tradition feeding into Vatican II, they do not supply the Sitz-im-Leben for Florence or Lateran IV.

I have already explained in the essay this person refers to (as well as in this post) why such a presumption is erroneous. And while more could be noted, what is there is sufficient for what that essay intended to achieve.

And as far as "clarity" it seems to this author that the Church has clarified herself continually when certain tenants of the faith are misrepresented. This has been accompanied by a development in doctrine and understanding.

Perhaps Dr. Art Sippo put it best… There was a clear development in doctrine from Bl. Pope Pius IX and his successors up to and including Vatican II, which crystallized the developments in a Dogmatic Constitution of no small degree of magisterial weight. The authentic understanding of this teaching has further been expounded upon in the magisteriums of Pope Paul VI and Pope John Paul II.

Note the bait-and-switch scam.

More like "note the attempt of someone who does not know more than (perhaps) the most basic of Catholic theology to discourse authoritatively on more advanced subject matter." That is what this person is doing here by placing principles in opposition to one another that are not actually opposed to one another. My point in the above statements is that there has been development on these matters since the time of Florence. That is to be expected. Likewise, these matters were better understood at the time of Florence than they were in the late first millennium. St. Augustine understood them better than St. Cyprian did. And so on and so forth.

McElhinney began by invoking the Sitz-im-Leben of Florence, but ends by invoking the development of doctrine. Yet these are contradictory criteria.

This is spoken by someone who (quite evidently) does not understand the principle of doctrinal development. This is hardly surprising because it is another subject which requires a bit of study to grasp the principles involved. In order to understand why what appears to be contradictory between Florence and Vatican II is actually not contradictory at all requires that not only the period prior to Florence be looked at but also the period between Florence and Vatican II. And contingent upon this approach is also the recognition that things understood or expressed in a partial or more nebulous fashion in earlier times can later on be understood or expressed in a fuller and more precise fashion.

The Sitz-im-Leben is tied to original intent, based on the life-situation of the original speakers. The development of doctrine is not tied to original intent.

I did not say that it did. As far as original intent goes, the only one of the two of us that has actually sought to highlight the various ingredients in this conceptual gumbo is me. The critic by contrast has simply repeated the sentences and presumed that they are self-evident. They have shown no familiarity whatsoever with the wider contextual elements that are involved in achieving a reliable hermeneutic of interpretation of the passages in question. Instead, they have merely asserted without proof that "contradictions" exist which anyone can do. But they have made no efforts whatsoever to try and harmonize the texts.

I remind the readers that people do the exact same thing with Bible texts: assert that there are "errors and contradictions" in the text. Again, talk is cheap and anyone can do it. This person would probably not be so critical of those who sought to demonstrate that there were not contradictions and errors in the biblical text. So I for one wish that they would kindly stop being inconsistent and acting as if those who do this with magisterial texts are somehow disingenuous while those who do this with the Bible are not. The underlying methodology to this approach is either commendable or it is not: they cannot have it both ways.{14}

Rather, its frame of reference is the chronological position and historical viewpoint of those who are living centuries after the sociological setting of the original document.

Again, the only one who has sought to engage the variegated elements of the original document is me. The person we are responding to has not even remotely done this.

And it indulges in a frankly anachronistic reading of the original by having it shoehorn into a retrospective trajectory of which the original framers had no cognizance or pre-cognition of.

Again, talk is cheap. I pointed out in that essay many of the elements that the original framers of Florence's decrees would have been cognizant of. In this response, I have referred to some of them again (sometimes via citations of my essay from the person I am responding to) and I have also added a few others which were not explicitly in that essay. In that essay, I sought to point out (i) principles that were in place long before Florence, (ii) principles that were recognized at Florence, (iii) situations subsequent to Florence which do not support this person's interpretation of the texts in question, and (iv) pointed out refinements of the previous principles subsequent to Florence which influenced Vatican II's much more complete and nuanced exposition on the same subject matter.

Like the Cheshire cat, the Catholic Church seems quite tangible and substantial at first sight, but when you try to pin down its claims, it does a slow-mo vanishing act.

This whole "pin down its claims" notion has a tonality of arrogance to it. The Church is both human and divine. It has visible elements and invisible realities. No one is going to "pin down" the divine and (primarily) intangible realities anymore than they could lasso the wind.

The divine and (primarily) intangible realities do not negate the visible elements but they do extend beyond them. If all of this sounds mystical to the Reformed individual I am responding to here, then so be it: I am doing the best I can with words to explain a mystery that words cannot completely do justice to. They may not agree with me but at the very least they should recognize what is involved here. They should also recognize that none of their objections to what I wrote in the essay they sought to critique actually standup when subjected to scrutiny. I am not about to call their response a "Cheshire response" but it sure resembles Lewis Carroll's famous feline a lot more convincingly than anything I wrote in the essay they sought to critique.

The text I have just interacted with can be read in its original form HERE.

Notes:

{1} If memory serves, it was the last the JunkYard BLOG update thread prior to the last one which was the thread I was near putting the finishing touches on at the time.

{2} There is also matters of doctrine and how that doctrine is applied in light of certain times, circumstances, and also operative assumptions. But to discuss that would be to spill a lot of type and I do not have that kind of time.

{3} There is also the fact that after years of study, I am very near concluding with certainty that the magisterium cannot even err in an ordinary capacity -to say nothing of an extraordinary one.

{4} The transmission of divine Revelation by the Church encounters difficulties of various kinds. These arise from the fact that the hidden mysteries of God "by their nature so far transcend the human intellect that even if they are revealed to us and accepted by faith, they remain concealed by the veil of faith itself and are as it were wrapped in darkness."[Vatican Council I: Dogmatic Constitution Dei Filius, ch. 4; Conc. Oec. Decr. (3), p. 808 (DS 3016).] Difficulties arise also from the historical condition that affects the expression of Revelation.

With regard to this historical condition, it must first be observed that the meaning of the pronouncements of faith depends partly upon the expressive power of the language used at a certain point in time and in particular circumstances. Moreover, it sometimes happens that some dogmatic truth is first expressed incompletely (but not falsely), and at a later date, when considered in a broader context of faith or human knowledge, it receives a fuller and more perfect expression. In addition, when the Church makes new pronouncements she intends to confirm or clarify what is in some way contained in Sacred Scripture or in previous expressions of Tradition; but at the same time she usually has the intention of solving certain questions or removing certain errors.

All these things have to be taken into account in order that these pronouncements may be properly interpreted. Finally, even though the truths which the Church intends to teach through her dogmatic formulas are distinct from the changeable conceptions of a given epoch and can be expressed without them, nevertheless it can sometimes happen that these truths may be enunciated by the Sacred Magisterium in terms that bear traces of such conceptions.

In view of the above, it must be stated that the dogmatic formulas of the Church's Magisterium were from the beginning suitable for communicating revealed truth, and that as they are they remain forever suitable for communicating this truth to those who interpret them correctly.[Cf. Pius IX, Brief "Eximiam Tuam," AAS 8 (1874-75), p. 447 (DS 2831); Paul VI, Encyclical Letter, Mysterium Fidei, AAS 57 (1965), p. 757ff. and L'Oriente cristiano nella luce di immortali Concilii, in Insegnamenti di Paolo VI, vol. 5, Vatican Polygot Press, p. 412ff.] It does not however follow that every one of these formulas has always been or will always be so to the same extent. For this reason theologians seek to define exactly the intention of teaching proper to the various formulas, and in carrying out this work they are of considerable assistance to the living Magisterium of the Church, to which they remain subordinated.

For this reason also it often happens that ancient dogmatic formulas and others closely connected with them remain living and fruitful in the habitual usage of the Church, but with suitable expository and explanatory additions that maintain and clarify their original meaning. In addition, it has sometimes happened that in this habitual usage of the Church certain of these formulas gave way to new expressions which, proposed and approved by the Sacred Magisterium, presented more clearly or more completely the same meaning.

As for the meaning of dogmatic formulas, this remains ever true and constant in the Church, even when it is expressed with greater clarity or more developed. The faithful therefore must shun the opinion, first, that dogmatic formulas (or some category of them) cannot signify truth in a determinate way, but can only offer changeable approximations to it, which to a certain extent distort of alter it; secondly, that these formulas signify the truth only in an indeterminate way, this truth being like a goal that is constantly being sought by means of such approximations. Those who hold such an opinion do not avoid dogmatic relativism and they corrupt the concept of the Church's infallibility relative to the truth to be taught or held in a determinate way. [Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith: Declaration Mysterium Ecclesiae (circa June 24, 1973)]

{5} It shows more evidence of them resorting to a kind of sola scriptura methodology: in this case more of a sola magisterium approach.

{6} This is well attested to in many ways -though it is perhaps best done when someone considers the traditional criteria the Church has used for distinguishing between mortal and venial sins (i.e sins that cause spirtual death and sins which cause a weakening in spiritual life). Mortal sins require three concurrent criteria which consist of (i) objectionably grave matter, (ii) full knowledge of the objectionably grave matter, and (iii) full consent of the will. If any of these are lacking, even what is generally speaking classified as a mortal sin is not imputed to the offender as anyting but a venial sin at worst.

Hence, someone who disobeyed the injunctions of Florence on salvation outside the Church (an objectively grave matter) who did not have either full knowledge or full consent in the matter would not be considered at fault. In other words, assuming for a moment they were involved in the objectively grave matter of not remaining in the church, if:

---they were not seeking to avoid removing their lack of knowledge by an ordinary use of due diligence, they would not be considered guilty of the full measure of sin.

If we assume that there was grave matter and full knowledge, there is still one other factor to consider:

---if they did not or were unable to give a full consent of the will (i.e. if they were trapped in a bad habit, coerced by some fashion into the objectively grave action, etc.) then there would still be blame but it would not be considered a mortal sin.

As only mortal sins in the Catholic tradition are what damn someone, it is hopefully clear why the approach to Florence so commonly taken by many who attempt to prooftext it apart from a proper ascertaining of the sitz im leben (which includes striving to account for general principles of theological interpretation) is destined to fail in demonstrating what they seek to demonstrate.

{7} I say "still present at Florence" because the Greeks had already left a couple of years earlier when the Copts and Armenians approached the Roman Church seeking reunion with her.

{8} See footnote six.

{9} The model of the Church as mystery (Lat. sacramentum) was probably first explicitly enunciated by St. Cyprian of Carthage in his treatise The Unity of the Church written in approximately 251 AD. It was slightly revised in 256 after his own run-in with the Bishop of Rome on a matter of doctrine [...] but that is another subject altogether.

Furthermore, there was coexisting with the Church as mystery model another conception of the Church: the Body of Christ model. This conception of the Church may well have more explicit Scriptural support than the Church as mystery model...

The ecclesiology of St. Cyprian was influential in the thought of St. Augustine whose work was influential on the thought of the great Scholastics such as St. Albert the Great, St. Bonaventure, and St. Thomas Aquinas. Even with the division of the west and the east, the Church's self-understanding as enunciated by the theologians who wrote tractates on the Church was primarily that of mystery...[Excerpt from Rerum Novarum (circa November 23, 2003)]

{10} Not to mention many of the other presuppositional points that I covered earlier in this post.

{11} As a good number of people will change course if what they perceive as true conflicts with their own inclinations.

{12} Again, see footnote six. All of this is why I have reiterated the serious error of interpreting Florence apart from all that preceded it (as well as what was subsequent to it).

{13} I refer here to the priesthood in its ministerial form. In some respects we are all priests of course but very few of us are priests who have received ordination via the sacrament of Order to minister in that unique capacity.

{14} As this person has sought to have it both ways, if we really wanted to get technical about it, they are the ones engaging in a true "bait-and-switch scam", not yours truly.