Expanding Futher on the Subject of Double Effect Viz. the Atomic Bombings:
I received an email back on the seventeenth of August to the thread I posted earlier that day on the atomic bombings and the problems common to ivory tower revisionists in discussing the subject. The emailer's words will be in black font. My comments will remain in regular font while any quotes are posted in darkblue font.
Well I read it, interesting laying out of the facts. However, I really don't see you outlining why dropping the bomb was a neutral act or how the principle of double effect applies here. (I'm not disagreeing with you per se, but I could see this as a valid criticism from the legalistic [Commentator].)
The first principle was to point out that The Commentator's assertions of 46,000 casualties was a misuse of statistics and that the actual estimates when all factors had been taken into consideration -only some of which I used in that note- pointed to the approach for lessening lives being that of dropping the bombs as we did.
The dropping of the bombs by my estimates saved 430,000 Japanese lives as well as preventing about a million plus military casualties. (That excludes civilian deaths and casualties mind you.) The dropping of the bombs also spared by my estimates between 65,000 and 350,000 American lives (if not more) and between 184,000-and 650,000 Japanese war casualties in a best case scenario. I also ran scenarios where the deaths amongst Japanese would be 414,000-460,000 and the casualties between 1,153,000 and 1,700,000. In light of these factors, I think you can see why The Commentator's assertions are not only ludicrous but a downright pipe dream.
From the standpoint of limiting death and injury, the dropping of the bombs was a slam dunk. That was the first point noted in that posting. The second was the assertion by The Commentator's that evil was being done for a good result. That is where the double effect principle comes into play.
The principle of double effect applies because the targets chosen were military ones and therefore the deaths of civilians were a derivative effect of destroying military targets rather than a primary focus. The situation is similar to one where a pregnant woman has cancer surgery despite knowledge that such surgery will result in an abortion: if the abortion is not willed then there is no sin should it happen. That is the same principle that is at work here.
Duble effect also comes into play in the area of self-defense (i.e. you accidentally kill someone when defending yourself from attack) and numerous other moral and ethical subjects. It furthermore comes into play with the whole interfaith gathering subject not to resurrect that subject at the present time. I remind you of the four criteria for double effect from my web posting -the latter of which is linked to the Hiroshima thread (in footnote eleven) for a reason. Nonetheless, let us unpack the criteria step by step so that it is easier to see how this moral/ethical principle applies to the subject in question:
---The act itself must be morally good or at least indifferent.
The bombing could be viewed either as a moral good (in light of how the bombs flattened two military targets and spared many deaths and casualties on both sides which would have occurred as a result of a land invasion) or as morally indifferent (in light of the fact that the bombs destructive range was known but in light of the known dispositions of the enemy -coupled with a desire to preserve lives on both sides- the two combine to essentially create a moral wash of sorts). I happen to favour the latter myself but I am open to persuasion of the former. Either way, the first critieria is met with the bombings.
---The agent may not positively will the bad effect but may merely permit it. If he could attain the good effect without the bad effect, he should do so. The bad effect is sometimes said to be indirectly voluntary.
President Truman (as the agent involved here acting in the US's stead) made it clear in his diary that though he anticipated civilian casualties that he chose these targets for their military significance: the latter being the reason he did not choose Tokyo or Kyoto which were heavily civilian populated and had no military significance.{1} In this sense, the bad effect can be said to be not positively willed but instead permitted or indirectly voluntary in a derivative sense.
Furthermore, a limiting of the lives which the bombs achieved could not have been realized by a land invasion alone; ergo that was not an option to avoid the bad effect. For other reasons I will not mention (but which an email on the matter from my friend Tim Tull the WWII maestro that I will post in a few days will make clear by implication){2} the blockade idea of "bringing the war machine to a halt" would not work either despite The Commentator's fantasies on the matter. If The Commentator is interested in saving lives, a blockade as they mentioned may have taken two years to reach a surrender and we have no way to estimate how many millions would have died in that time from starvation.{3}
---The good effect must flow from the action at least as immediately (in the order of causality, though not necessarily in the order of time) as the bad effect. In other words, the good effect must be produced directly by the action, not by the bad effect. Otherwise, the agent would be using a bad means to a good end, which is never allowed.
I think we can definitely say that the good effect of limiting overall deaths and achieving a quick end to the war were a direct flow from the action itself and as immediate as the bad effect -albeit not necessarily in order of time. In other words, the surrender and quick end of the war and the sparing of hundreds of thousands if not millions of lives was produced directly from the actions themselves (with the civilian deaths being a derivative thereof). For that reason, it is not using a bad means to a good end as The Commentator asserted.
---The good effect must be sufficiently desirable to compensate for the allowing of the bad effect. In forming this decision many factors must be weighed and compared, with care and prudence proportionate to the importance of the case. Thus, an effect that benefits or harms society generally has more weight than one that affects only an individual; an effect sure to occur deserves greater consideration than one that is only probable; an effect of a moral nature has greater importance than one that deals only with material things.
This factor in light of what I noted already is easily met.
And as all four criteria for double effect are met with the actions we took with Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the principle of double effect can be said to legitimately apply here.
Note:
{1} Whether or not a later bombing of Kyoto or Tokyo in this fashion would have similarly been unjustified is debatable. Certainly though, it would have been with the first two bombs being dropped since those were heavily-populated cities with no military (and only psychological) significance.
{2} The email from Tim I mentioned in that response was posted back on the nineteenth of August.
{3} For further clarification on the matter, I refer the readers to the email posted earlier this morning the text of which I have forwarded to Tim for verification of the contents thereof. (It looks very accurate to me but if Tim sees problems with it, I will clarify them in a short update to that thread.)
Labels: Expository Musings, Pol/Elect/Sociopol/Geopol, Pres. Truman, Reason/Logic/Ethics, War/WOT/Etc.








