On Fundamental Rights, Common Law Principles, and Abortion:(Musings of your humble servant at
Rerum Novarum)
[Prefatory Note: For a prologue of sorts to the material to be covered in this posting, please see this thread. -ISM]In the usual round of calls for "
celebration" of a legal case that directly violates one of the three fundamental rights of man, the predictable "stare decisis" canard was brought out in some circles to justify the decision of the Supreme Court in 1992's
Planned Parenthood vs. Casey decision upholding
Roe vs. Wade. This is in essence an indirect appeal to common law to justify this stance as that is where
stare decisis has its legal foundation. A problem with this premise is that it ignores certain key factors which went into proper common law interpretation. To explain this a bit, a consideration of where common law originated would be a good idea so I will sketch it out briefly before picking up this thread on the other side with the assistance of a short online chronology:
Until the 12th century, law in the western world consisted of written laws, called Civil Laws, all traceable to Roman Law. This basic system still prevails in many countries as well as in the state of Louisiana. However, after the Norman conquest of Britain in 1066, a legal tradition called the "common law," different from that of civil law, began to develop in England. In the 1100s during the reign of the legal reformer, Henry II, court decisions were written down and catalogued according to the types of cases. When the courts were called on to decide similar issues later, they reviewed the earlier decisions and if one was found that covered the earlier decision, they applied the principle of the earlier decision. They called this doctrine, "stare decisis," a Latin term meaning "to stand by the decision." Under this rule of stare decisis, once a legal issue has been resolved as it applied to a particular set of facts, a court did not reconsider that legal issue in a later case where the factual circumstances were substantially similar. But this did not mean that every decision stood forever. However, the principle of stare decisis was a strong one, and judges were reluctant to discard well-established rules, and took great pains to explain a significant departure from a precedent. During America's colonial period, most of the English common law tradition did not change, and the new country continued to follow English common law. When the U.S. Constitution was ratified in 1789, the Constitution, based upon the common law inherited from England, became the new foundation on which the American legal system was built. [From Understanding Common Law (circa 1994)]We know of course that the Founding Fathers of America were men of a high degree of education and were thoroughly familiar with common law -most of them either being born in Great Britain or first generation removed from Great Britain. And roughly thirty-five of the fifty-five odd participants of the Constitutional Convention either were experienced barristers or otherwise had training in the law. I outlined some of the more significant figures
here and believe me, they are far from the only ones I could mention. And when you consider the predominately English background of so many of the Founding Fathers, it is only logical to conclude that so many educated barristers would have a solid understanding of what common law did and did not involve would it not???
Now then, if
stare decisis is a core principle of the common law, than one has to look to how that principle was understood in common law and not merely
say it applies without providing any evidences. A good place to start is to ask what the foundational principles that under girded common law actually were. According to a certain Richard J. Maybury, they were as follows:
Do all you have agreed to do;
Do not encroach on other persons or their property. [From Understanding Common Law (circa 1994)] The first premise would form the fundamental point of reference of what is called "contract law" as that branch of jurisprudence deals with what people have agreed to do amongst one another and the myriad of ways this is signified both explicitly and by logical inference. The second premise (
"[d]o not encroach on other persons or their property") is perhaps
the fundamental point of reference for all criminal and tort law.
Now then, if the interpretation of the above premises is correct{1}, then common law involves protection of the fundamental rights of man which are life, faculties, and production. Or to quote Claude Frederic Bastiat's magnum opus
The Law on these matters:
We hold from God the gift which includes all others. This gift is life-physical, intellectual, and moral life. But life cannot maintain itself alone. The Creator of life has entrusted us with the responsibility of preserving, developing, and perfecting it. In order that we may accomplish this, He has provided us with a collection of marvelous faculties. And He has put us in the midst of a variety of natural resources. By the application of our faculties to these natural resources we convert them into products, and use them. This process is necessary in order that life may run its appointed course. Life, faculties, production-in other words, individuality, liberty, property this is man. And in spite of the cunning of artful political leaders, these three gifts from God precede all human legislation, and are superior to it. Life, liberty, and property do not exist because men have made laws. On the contrary, it was the fact that life, liberty, and property existed beforehand that caused men to make laws in the first place. [Claude Frederic Bastiat: The Law (circa 1850) as quoted in a Rerum Novarum posting (circa October 3, 2002)] Now then, consider the theory{2} of fundamental rights which I have reiterated at this weblog not to mention developed further{3} in light of contemporary realities and applied to a whole plethora of issues in years past. The premise is that there is a gift from God given to us which encompasses the physical (life), intellectual (faculties), and moral (production) spheres of existence. This gift precedes all human laws and was the basis on which all human laws were constructed to begin with -whether those who constructed them realized it or not. From there a need to know what law actually is comes into play since to argue anything on the basis of
stare decisis requires knowing what the function of law is. And again, let us consider Bastiat's synthesis on that subject before getting to the whole
stare decisis issue:
What, then, is law? It is the collective organization of the individual right to lawful defense. Each of us has a natural right - from God - to defend his person, his liberty, and his property. These are the three basic requirements of life, and the preservation of any one of them is completely dependent upon the preservation of the other two. For what are our faculties but the extension of our individuality? And what is property but an extension of our faculties? If every person has the right to defend even by force-his person, his liberty, and his property, then it follows that a group of men have the right to organize and support a common force to protect these rights constantly. Thus the principle of collective right-its reason for existing, its lawfulness-is based on individual right. And the common force that protects this collective right cannot logically have any other purpose or any other mission than that for which it acts as a substitute. [Claude Frederic Bastiat: The Law (circa 1850) as quoted in a Rerum Novarum posting (circa October 3, 2002)] Think about that for a moment: the common force of law has the same purpose as the individual one. The logic behind this should be obvious but often it is not. Moving on...
Thus, since an individual cannot lawfully use force against the person, liberty, or property of another individual, then the common force for the same reason-cannot lawfully be used to destroy the person, liberty, or property of individuals or groups. Such a perversion of force would be, in both cases, contrary to our premise. Force has been given to us to defend our own individual rights. Who will dare to say that force has been given to us to destroy the equal rights of our brothers? Since no individual acting separately can lawfully use force to destroy the rights of others, does it not logically follow that the same principle also applies to the common force that is nothing more than the organized combination of the individual forces? [Claude Frederic Bastiat: The Law (circa 1850) as quoted in a Rerum Novarum posting (circa October 3, 2002)] Those who wonder why true conservatives worthy of the name{4} have an abhorrence of the federal government intervening everywhere and anywhere this is the reason in a nutshell even if those conservatives have never stopped to crystallize their instinct into a coherent principle before. The reason is an instinctive understanding that law is made for man not man for law: the understanding that law's purpose is to protect legitimate rights not to grant them and not to revoke them.{5}
The Founding Fathers had such a fear of putting too much power into the hands of a limited few that they created the "checks and balances" system we are aware of because of their knowledge of history and what power can do when it is abused. They may not have explicitly formulated their understanding in the manner that Bastiat did but certainly Bastiat had as a source of his inspiration the United States as it existed in his day.{6} But to sum up the purpose of law, it can be seen in the following way:
If this is true, then nothing can be more evident than this: The law is the organization of the natural right of lawful defense. It is the substitution of a common force for individual forces. And this common force is to do only what the individual forces have a natural and lawful right to do: to protect persons, liberties, and properties; to maintain the right of each, and to cause justice to reign over us all. [Claude Frederic Bastiat: The Law (circa 1850) as quoted in a Rerum Novarum posting (circa October 3, 2002)] By this understanding, any action by the law that goes beyond these boundaries is a perversion of law. And not only is any law that is contrary to the Constitution invalid but any active resolution taken by the judiciary likewise is invalid. Or as Alexander Hamilton explained in
Federalist #78 on the powers of the judiciary as embodied in the Constitution that at the time of his writing still awaited ratification by a majority of states to become the law of the land:
The judiciary, on the contrary, has no influence over either the sword or the purse; no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the society; and can take no active resolution whatever. It may truly be said to have neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment; and must ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of its judgments...The complete independence of the courts of justice is peculiarly essential in a limited Constitution...Limitations of this kind can be preserved in practice no other way than through the medium of courts of justice, whose duty it must be to declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the Constitution void. Without this, all the reservations of particular rights or privileges would amount to nothing. [Alexander Hamilton: Excerpt from Federalist Paper #78 as quoted in a Rerum Novarum posting (circa July 1, 2003)]In other words, the judiciary under the Constitution has the duty to declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the Constitution as void. That includes so-called "right to privacy" which however nice it would be to have in the federal Constitution{7} nonetheless is not there in any way, shape, matter, or form.
As far as the common law understanding goes, if part of the understanding is not to encroach on persons or their property, than common law statutes such as
stare decisis then we have an issue here that touches on the very heart of the issue in question. We need to know where life begins or at least have a consensus on a certain point of origin as the starting point before we can legitimately invoke
stare decisis. Consider though what the court itself said in the majority decision handed down on January 22, 1973 on the matter of when life begins:
Texas urges that, apart from the Fourteenth Amendment, life begins at conception and is present throughout pregnancy, and that, therefore, the State has a compelling interest in protecting that life from and after conception. We need not resolve the difficult question of when life begins. When those trained in the respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and theology are unable to arrive at any consensus, the judiciary, at this point in the development of man's knowledge, is not in a position to speculate as to the answer. [Supreme Court: Roe vs. Wade (circa January 22, 1973)]In other words, the decision was to be made without concern for a key element of what the common law was intended to do: not encroach on persons or their property. In order to determine whether common law (on which the Constitution is heavily based) is efficaciously fulfilling its role or not means that one has to determine if they are dealing with a life or not because a life is a person and common law is intended to protect persons.
We know of course that there is dispute over when life begins but if we do not try to resolve that inquiry to the best of our knowledge, then common law risks being misapplied. The very
Declaration of Independence on which this nation was founded -and on which the Constitution properly understood would have to presume apriori for its own legitimization- had this to say about the issue at hand:
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. [Excerpt from The Declaration of Independence (circa July 4, 1776)]Now is not the time to point out that this principle was not always consistently applied in our Republic -indeed despite the Fifth Amendment in the Bill of Rights, there were still some people who were denied the right so outlined. The purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment itself was in part to remedy this with regards to persons previously denied these rights for reasons other than disenfranchisement for serious crimes committed against others. But just because a principle is not always applied consistently does not therefore make the principle itself suspect -something I have noted
before on a few occasions and which bears recalling whenever issues such as this are discussed.
When Texas urges that a fetus is entitled to Fourteenth Amendment protection as a person, it faces a dilemma. Neither in Texas nor in any other State are all abortions prohibited. Despite broad proscription, an exception always exists. The exception contained in Art. 1196, for an abortion procured or attempted by medical advice for the purpose of saving the life of the mother, is typical. But if the fetus is a person who is not to be deprived of life without due process of law, and if the mother's condition is the sole determinant, does not the Texas exception appear to be out of line with the Amendment's command? [Supreme Court: Roe vs. Wade (circa January 22, 1973)]This whole supposed "dilemma" is easily overcome by taking into account an ancient moral and ethical principle which the Founding Fathers would have with the greatest of likelihood had some familiarity with if not by virtue of it being a longstanding moral and ethical principle then arguably by virtue of the principles they used in crafting the Constitution itself.{8} I refer here to the moral and ethical principle of
double effect.
But even if they were not explicitly familiar with it, it is not debatable that these men of uniformly high intelligence for not only their era but any other era would have the intellectual capabilities of understanding and appreciating the principles involved. As to whether or not the Supreme Court in 1973 would have had these capabilities is (of course) controverted to say the least but they sure betray a lack of familiarity in the words used to formulate the decision of their majority.
If we take seriously (i) Claude Frederic Bastiat's theory on the fundamental rights of man as well as (ii) the words of the
Declaration of Independence on which the American Republic was founded on, not to mention (iii) the proper understanding of common law as a check against encroaching upon other persons or their property, then the idea of applying
stare decisis to the Roe vs. Wade court interpolation of a presumed "right" to abortion is too ludicrous to be taken seriously.
For one thing, if the matter does involve life -and it seems more than a mere
hypothesis to this writer that life is involved at some point between conception and birth- than it is important to ascertain as best we can and apart from personal agendas where we can determine life to begin and at that point, it is inviolable without due process. The question then becomes when does life begin??? Would one say it begins with a heartbeat??? With evidence of brainwave activity??? With the ability to feel pain??? If you have said yes to all three of these things, then we are looking at life beginning
before the third month of pregnancy if not earlier.Think about that for a moment: if the latter is the case, then abortion
in at least the time frame where the latter three factors are in effect acts as a death sentence for a life which was denied due process: a violation of a fundamental God-given right (cf.
The Law) and a right that the Founders saw as self-evident (cf.
Declaration of Independence). On either standard alone it is to be rejected but the idea that the Constitution of the United States could be based on a premise contrary to the
Declaration of Independence, and that the aforementioned Constitution could have a presumed "right" to take the life of anyone without the very due process which the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution{9} requires- it does not add up folks.
That is right,
Roe vs. Wade is not only unconstitutional but also unconscionable. It does not matter that judicial
whores and termites play with words and semantics: the taking of life without due process is not morally acceptable. And that the judges singing onto the majority decision of
Roe vs. Wade claimed that it was not necessary to know when life begins in order to make a ruling is itself heinous because one must know when life begins if one is going to avoid taking it without due process. That those judges did not care to try and do this -and furthermore showed that they do not care about ruling in accordance with the Constitution but instead sacrificing lives on the altar of utility- is something that anyone who claims to respect people should find noxious to their very core.
It is illogical to presume that
stare decisis as a principle of common law can be wielded to oppose the very intention of common law to begin with. And the idea of that the Founding Fathers who founded this nation and established its rule of law -most of which were well-educated in the field of law including common law- would have provided for such a heinous so-called "right" that contradicted the very foundation of the common law that they took for granted is more than just a little problem that the supporters of
Roe vs. Wade have to deal with. They also have to deal with the argument that
Roe vs. Wade violates the Constitution's Fifth Amendment right to not be deprived of life without due process,{10} it violates the right to life that the signers of the
Declaration of Independence asserted was "self-evident", and it violates one of what Claude Frederic Bastiat called the "three fundamental rights of man."
Those who would take issue with any of these theses and claim that life is not involved have an obligation to provide a hypothesis of their own on when life
does begin. Otherwise, they cannot complain when their position is opposed by people who
do respect the right to life and who have taken a public stand (rightly or wrongly) on where life does begin -and use that stand as a
foundational presupposition for how they approach the issue of abortion and
other potentially life-related issues thereof.
Notes:{1} And for those who would claim it is not, they are challenged to propose a counter-hypothesis or there is no need to take them seriously.
{2}
[W]hen one is dealing with a theory, they are dealing with both abstract notions as well as coordinating dynamic principles of action. One of the author's intellectual mentors once defined a theory as "a set of non contradictory abstract ideas (or as philosophers like to call them 'principles') which purports to be either a correct description of reality or a guideline for successful action."...Having established a working meaning of the term theory, it is worth noting also that the word thesis according to the Merriam Webster Thesaurus is related to the word theory. (Both of them having a foundation in the term assumption.) A good way of looking at this in the current context is to view a thesis as "an abstract principle or proposition to be advanced and maintained by argument" and a theory as incorporating a thesis -or a series of theses -with a guideline for successful action. The reason for this is because a theory by its nature must involve either (i) a correct description of reality or (ii) a guideline for successful action. For this reason, any viable theory involves several principles if you will which work together.Or another way of looking at it would be to consider that a theory is being conceived of a series of non contradictory coordinative theses or points of presupposition. When viewed in this light, a theory clearly is only as strong as the theses which support it. [Excerpt from the Rerum Novarum Miscellaneous BLOG (circa January 14, 2004)]{3} Now is not the time to go into how I did this but basically I explicated a premise that was heavily implied in Bastiat's work and added a
non-normative verifying principle to the mix to assist in objective application thereof.
{4} Do not get me started on how few of these there are -particularly in politics.
{5} Part of the reason I developed Bastiat's theory further is to deal with the situations where it can be argued that someone can be deprived of one or more of their fundamental rights -but that is a subject for another time perhaps.
{6}
As long as it is admitted that the law may be diverted from its true purpose-that it may violate property instead of protecting it-then everyone will want to participate in making the law, either to protect himself against plunder or to use it for plunder. Political questions will always be prejudicial, dominant, and all-absorbing. There will be fighting at the door of the Legislative Palace, and the struggle within will be no less furious. To know this, it is hardly necessary to examine what transpires in the French and English legislatures; merely to understand the issue is to know the answer. Is there any need to offer proof that this odious perversion of the law is a perpetual source of hatred and discord; that it tends to destroy society itself? If such proof is needed, look at the United States [in 1850]. There is no country in the world where the law is kept more within its proper domain: the protection of every person's liberty and property. As a consequence of this, there appears to be no country in the world where the social order rests on a firmer foundation. But even in the United States, there are two issues-and only two-that have always endangered the public peace. [Claude Frederic Bastiat: The Law (circa 1850) as quoted in aRerum Novarum posting (circa October 24, 2002)]{7} I actually favour this as a right but as it is not in the Constitution itself, an amendment would have to be proposed and accepted by three quarters of all the states (in this case, 38 states) in order to become a Constitutional provision thereof.
{8} This is a
hypothesis admittedly but one which if time allowed for it I believe I could viably argue for the favour of.
{9} The Fourteenth Amendment is not mentioned here because it essentially remedied an inconsistency in the application of the Fifth Amendment clarifying the applicability of the right to due process being one for
"[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof."{10} See footnote nine.