Trump's Pardon of Susan B Anthony a Deft Political Move

Miscellaneous Musings on Cigars, Gambling, and Alcohol:
As it was today day eighteen years ago that this site was launched, I will delve a bit more into personal stuff about myself of the sort that has not been posted to this site in many years. The following was taken from some of what I posted in social media sources in the past couple of months. Without further ado...

Unless I am at a place like a cigar lounge, I always smoke cigars outside. Its one of my rules if you will. I have rules for a lot of things I do -to give three examples, playing blackjack, drinking beer, and smoking cigars.

With blackjack, I always went north to Tulalip or south to Emerald Queen near Puyallup and played at the Indian casinos and never played at any card house in town. Its not that I did not win, I did good for myself most of the time. But the travel made it an event. (I also refuse to play unless there is a human dealer; ergo, I have not played at the NY casinos in my time out here.) While far from my only rules, there are a few of the strictures I put in place for playing blackjack.

With alcohol, I have specific kinds of beer and wine I will drink (particularly beer) and if a place I go to does not have what I want, I drink water. Mixed drinks are for special occasions only, heck right now even alcohol is as I have weight to lose and until I again hit an acceptable place there, even occasional beer is off limits.

Likewise, with me cigars are an event. I even stopped smoking them in my cars back in 2012 -one of the few non-outside refuges I once allowed myself: not its only outside or places like a cigar lounge. That means it requires scheduling, etc and its far from a random thing.

I have structures I put in place for these things for various reasons let us just say.

Briefly on the Biblical Canon:

This exchange took place in social media yesterday. My words will be in regular font. Without further ado...

Catholism was founded on a political movement and has nothing to do with being a born again believer. Jesus said a man must be born again to enter heaven.  That has nothing to with good works or praying through Mary for Jesus to hear prayers.  That's why a nun can stand there. She would not know Jesus if he personally knocked on her door tonight.

...

no that's Catholic tradition and not Christian history. Peter was a Jew and the first believers were all Jews.  Paul, a Jew, preached to the pegans which caused a rift between Paul and Peter.  The first believers were still practicing Judaism but later changed under Paul's guidance and The Holy Spirit's conviction.  The Catholic faith was established later and attached to a political movement. 

Every Christian that professes Christ but does not live by the bible is as guilty as the nuns preaching the bible at a Biden rally

Theology has nothing to do with biblical truth.

The Catholic Church assembled the biblical canon based in no small part on its tradition. Furthermore, the biblical canon was not finally settled until nearly 400 years after the death of Jesus. You are in other words putting your faith in the Catholic Church getting the collection of books in your bible right. On what basis are you sure they got that right when you take issue with them in so many other areas?

Shawn there are books in the Catholic bible evangelicals  reject. I trust the Holy Spirit not a political organization.

That is a purely arbitrary position taken by evangelicals. How do you know if you cannot trust the Catholics on much of anything else --even on which books are in the OT-- that they got the 27 books of the NT right?

With all due respect "I trust the Holy Spirit" is a copout because you have wildly divergent views all claiming Holy Spirit guidance. Either the Holy Spirit is schizophrenic or most of those claiming Holy Spirit guidance are frauds.

Again, the source of the 27 book NT canon is the Catholic Church. Why should they be trusted there if you do not trust them on anything else?

Revisiting A Controversial Anniversary:
(And Reiterating A Recent Ethical Challenge)

I have written more on the subject pertaining to this anniversary in years past than I wish I had in retrospect. Rather than saying anything new at this time, I have decided to repost two threads previously written on this subject. One is a retrospective commemoration published three years ago.{1} The other is one that begin taking explicit shape{2} in my mind when the aforementioned commemoration material was being drafted.{3} See the footnotes below for details.

This is all I plan to say on the subject for the foreseeable future except I will expect anyone I see publicly{4} bloviating on these subjects during the season for it to take up the proposed ethical challenge I recently published{5} or quite frankly to shut the hell up about it. No more needs to be said on these matters at this time than that; ergo, that is all I will say.

Notes:

{1} Commemorating A Controversial Anniversary (circa August 17, 2017) 

{2} I say explicit shape because I had long had in mind at least implicitly addressing the subject in this sort of fashion if ever I was to involve myself in it again.

{3} On the 1945 Atomic Bomb Controversy and A Proposed Ethical Challenge (circa August 9, 2020) 

{4} Particularly various and sundry pundits, agenda provocateurs, and apologists.

{5} See footnote three.

Pope: Mary's Assumption huge step forward for humanity

Points to Ponder:

Unless I am at a place like a cigar lounge, I always smoke cigars outside. Its one of my rules if you will. I have rules for a lot of things I do.

As the birther morons have resurfaced like the political herpies that they are, I will at this time repost two threads{1} written in 2012 for social media which were later reposted to this site when after it was reactivated. Without further ado...

On Natural Born Citizenship (circa October 29, 2018)

More on the Subject of Natural Born Citizenship (circa October 31, 2018)

Hopefully the birthtards going after Kamala Harris will stick to areas of legitimate targeting of her{2} and ignore these kinds of idiocies.

Notes:

{1} I wrote a lot on these subjects back in 2012 on social media when this site was suspended. Only a few of the threads have been posted here -two 

{2} Of which there are many.

Points to Ponder:

There is a constant need some have to try and diminish a person or group out there doing good for others. Such attitudes and actions are not part of the solution but instead are part of the problem.

Be part of the solution.

A Plan To Pay Off The National Debt...
(Musings of your humble servant at Rerum Novarum)

This is the text of a mostly finished Facebook note from November 4, 2017 which was completed recently for publication.

As of this writing, we are approximately $20 $26 trillion dollars in debt if we talk about the national debt alone.{1} To listen to many folks, the idea of paying this sum off is a pipe dream at best. I will concede that there is a serious lack of political will in both major political parties{2}; however, that does not mean that plans cannot be offered. I will now offer what I hope is a simple plan that everyone can get behind.

To start with, we need to abolish baseline budgeting. I am not going to go into this in detail right now but suffice to say, by statute all budgetary items are automatically increased and right now that is approximately 7% a year on every budgetary item. We then see stupid political fights if say Republicans propose to reduce that 7% on some programs to say 4% and Democrats disingenuously claim Republicans are “cutting spending” or some other stupid claim. Reducing automatic increases is never an actual cut in spending and only morons think it is. However, there are no shortage of morons who do not mind making these sorts of claims to try and score cheap political points by appealing to the rubes amongst the populace who have no idea how any of this works. But to return to the point at hand here: as long as the baseline budgeting model is used, a bias exists in the budgetary calculation method that favours increased spending.{3} And when spending increases are the default mechanism to any budgetary projections, that makes balancing budgets very tough not to mention actually paying down debt
.

So first step in the process is eliminating baseline budgeting and replacing it with zero based budgeting starting from whatever the budget was ten years ago. I picked the figure of ten years ago because the budget was already bloated like a hippo ten years ago at $2.98 trillion. Surely no one would claim the country cannot survive on a mere $2.98 trillion per year, right? So with that in mind, every budgetary item is rolled back to its spending level in 2008 and any items not in the budget at that time are subjected to the rules involved with zero based budgeting.

Zero based budgeting in a nutshell requires that all spending must be automatically 

justified anew each year or it will be eliminated from the budget. Zero based budgeting is not concerned with maintaining previous spending levels and places the default mechanism on budgetary reductions. So the first step in this plan is zero based budgeting so that we nip automatic budget increases in the rump from the get go.{4} The next part concerns actually balancing budgets.

I am going to part ways with many conservatives out there and say forget about a balanced budget amendment. Why? Because it is a true pipe dream. We will never get two thirds of both houses in congress to approve it so why expend energy on it? What we can do however is impose sequestration. And I propose we do this on every single item in the budget. Every budget item no matter what it is gets automatically cut every year. I propose a 5% sequestration on every budget item every year. This would remove the politics from various sides whining about any special favour being shown to one persons sacred cows over another because in this plan, everyone’s sacred cows get a 5% trim automatically.

Now as we start the process of operating with more of a balanced budget mindset, we can turn our attention to the debt itself. For it does not solve the issue of the debt to just run a string of balanced budgets if the overarching debt is not actually paid off. So here is the plan for that: establish a sinking fund. Alexander Hamilton put one in place in 1790 aimed at retiring 5% of the debt every year until it was paid off. And while it took a while to do, the debt was paid off in full by 1835.{5} So using a similar methodology, a sinking fund is established aimed at paying down 5% of debt a year. The money is apart from the budget and used only for paying down debt principal. How does it work?

The sinking fund uses the basic concept of compound interest to eradicate debt quickly. The origins of the idea date back to 14th century Italy, but I will start with 18th century Great Britain and the United States. William Pitt{6} employed the fund in the 1780s as British debt accrued at a rapid rate due to the war, and the US chose a similar path in the 1790s. A set amount of money was put aside every year to redeem outstanding government debt. The money was used to purchase public securities as an investment. Each year the interest gained on public securities was added to the fund. With the simple use of compound interest, the fund could grow significantly.{7}

As far as how the sinking fund would be funded, recourse can be had to what Alexander Hamilton said in The Federalist insofar as the advantages of consumption taxes:

It is a signal advantage of taxes on articles of consumption, that they contain in their own nature a security against excess. They prescribe their own limit; which cannot be exceeded without defeating the end proposed, that is, an extension of the revenue. When applied to this object, the saying is as just as it is witty, that, "in political arithmetic, two and two do not always make four." If duties are too high, they lessen the consumption; the collection is eluded; and the product to the treasury is not so great as when they are confined within proper and moderate bounds. This forms a complete barrier against any material oppression of the citizens by taxes of this class, and is itself a natural limitation of the power of imposing them. 

Impositions of this kind usually fall under the denomination of indirect taxes, and must for a long time constitute the chief part of the revenue raised in this country. Those of the direct kind, which principally relate to land and buildings, may admit of a rule of apportionment. Either the value of land, or the number of the people, may serve as a standard. The state of agriculture and the populousness of a country have been considered as nearly connected with each other. And, as a rule, for the purpose intended, numbers, in the view of simplicity and certainty, are entitled to a preference. In every country it is a herculean task to obtain a valuation of the land; in a country imperfectly settled and progressive in improvement, the difficulties are increased almost to impracticability. The expense of an accurate valuation is, in all situations, a formidable objection. In a branch of taxation where no limits to the discretion of the government are to be found in the nature of things, the establishment of a fixed rule, not incompatible with the end, may be attended with fewer inconveniences than to leave that discretion altogether at large.{8}

Now one reason why Hamilton’s original sinking fund while successful was at the same time erratic is it was not set aside solely for retiring the public debt. I am proposing therefore a greater restriction on this use of a sinking fund; namely, that it would only be used for retiring public debt. As for funding, I think it could be largely handled the same ways Hamilton funded his: through western land sales and consumption taxes on luxury items. The federal government owns a majority of the land among the western states but they also own land in other states. Perhaps a law that specifies a maximum of say 10% of a state's land in states admitted to the union prior to February 15, 1912{9} and a maximum of 30% of a states land in states admitted subsequent to that time can be held by the federal government with a ten year flex period to sell said land. There could also be specific types of taxes{10} formulated specifically for this purpose and it could be applied specifically and only for retiring public debt.

While far from complete, this is a broad based outline for being able to start the process of getting a handle first on deficits and then on the national debt which is in excess of $20 trillion now. Any solution needs to be bipartisan as well as handle budgetary items across the board so no favourites are played for anyone. And what needs to be recognized is that both budgets need to be cut as well as taxes raised and that the government cannot be trusted without constraints to do the right thing.
We can have contested arguments on a number of issues but the national debt as former Indiana Governor Mitch Daniels liked to say is the new Red Menace and therefore we should agree to fix this bipartisan problem with a bipartisan solution.


Notes:

{1} I have no intention of touching on unfunded liabilities in this note as that is a subject best handled separately.

{2} It may exist in smaller political parties to a certain extent but as they are too insignificant to make a real difference, nothing more needs to be said about them on these matters.

{3} Because the operative presupposition with baseline budgeting is that federal spending keeps pace with inflation.

{4} Considering that the total budget in 2008 was $2.98 trillion and the total revenue from 2018 is projected to be $3.65 trillion, we already start with a $670 billion surplus of funds for immediate debt reduction sans any increased amount needed to service interest on the debt that has increased by roughly ten trillion since that time.

{5} The budget already has funds for servicing the interest on the debt so it need not be dealt with here.

{6} The prime minister of Great Britain.

{7} Which considering the extent of our national debt would be of assistance in tackling it.

{8} Publius: Excerpt from The Federalist #21 (circa December 12, 1787)

{9} This would make the 10% threshold only apply to the lower 48 states.

{10} This would involve consumption taxes on luxury items.

Points to Ponder:

There are a lot of problems in the world but there are also a lot of folks out there. Even if we figure half of them (on a good day) or two thirds of them (on a bad day) are wasting oxygen and earth space, there is still a lot of useful folks left. Each person doing a little on as many fronts as possible would over time help fix a lot of these problems. And there are a lot of ways to help out. Everyone who sincerely wants to help can find a way, even if all they can do is pray.

Find a way.

On the 1945 Atomic Bomb Controversy and A Proposed Ethical Challenge:
(Musings of your humble servant at Rerum Novarum)

"Critical analysis is not just an evaluation of the means actually employed, but of all possible means---which have to be formulated, that is, invented. One can, after all, not condemn a method without being able to suggest a better alternative." [Carl von Clausewitz]

The kernel or germ of this ethical challenge can be found in the very first thread I ever published on this subject about fifteen years ago. It was an offhand comment on my part at the time and I certainly have in mind a more developed version of it at this time. Without further ado:

I am left wondering if in The Commentator's eyes it would have been less evil to deliberately choose the path of greater carnage (as would have been the case with an invasion of mainland Japan) or that of lessor carnage???{1}

After years of additional observation, I have concluded that the substance of the above question is worth considering. To summarize in a single sentence: is it ethical when presented with options to choose that which causes greater damage and loss of life or that which involves less? That will be what is considered here when addressing this challenge to those who frequently return to the subject of the atomic bombings of 1945 like a drug addict repeatedly returns to their dealer for their latest "fix." At some point, the addict needs to seek treatment for their addiction or it will do them in. Likewise, those who return to this subject again and again need some kind of treatment for both rational as well as spiritual reasons. So to aid in that manner, an ethical challenge will be extended to those with the guts to take it up.

To set up the intention of this posting, it is necessary to encapsulate in a syllabus format, various facts on the subject of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. I will not undertake anew the defense of any of these points as they have been often written on and more than adequately sustained by your host in years past. It is not my fault that they have been regularly ignored by the (at best) vincibly ignorant but that is neither here nor there. 

So without further ado, I present the aforementioned syllabus of points:

--The land invasion of Imperial Japan casualty estimates paraded about by some sadly misinformed pundits, agenda provocateurs, and apologists were highly inaccurate on both sides in terms of being so low as to be laughable.{2}

--The targets chosen for bombings were of no small military significance insofar as carriers, munitions, aircrafts, and torpedoes were built there and army divisions were stationed there as well.{3}

--The morally heinous nature of the enemy and the truly brutal nature of their conduct during that war{4} was unique in the modern era of warfare if not in the entire history of war. 

--Reasonable arguments can be made that "Placing American troops at risk in attacking the homeland of such an enemy itself represented an unacceptable moral risk."{5}

--The moral and ethical principle of double effect when all factors are considered was met in the manner whereby the atomic bombs were utilized at Hiroshima and Nagasaki.{6}

--The pundits, agenda provocateurs, and apologists who try to argue this point not infrequently fall into various and sundry argumentation fallacies.{7} 

--Addressing the aforementioned frequent argumentation fallacies of the pundits, agenda provocateurs, and apologists inexorably causes these discussions to spiral down a rabbit hole.{8} Ergo, to attempt to get back on track to any degree of potential usefulness after such an endeavour is just as inevitably a waste of valuable time and effort.{9}

--Just war principles can be plausibly argued to have applied to the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki when all pertinent factors have been taken into consideration.{10}

--The purported military experts whose quotes of opposition are often uncritically peppered throughout these discussions by pundits, agenda provocateurs, and apologists have been meticulously debunked. They were to a man not as familiar with the matter as those who casually throw their names about tend to presume.{11} 

--The conscription element has been badly misunderstood as well as very poorly represented by everyone I have seen who has sought to discuss these subjects.{12} 

--There is no actual Magisterial teaching on this subject despite certain intellectually dependent pundits, agenda provocateurs, and apologists who have desperately tried to manufacture one from stray offhand comments by a pope here or there.{13}  

--The aforementioned pundits, agenda provocateurs, and apologists in their slipshod proof texting of certain magisterial texts have amply demonstrated that they know very little about what does and does not constitute actual magisterial teaching.{14}

--Those same pundits, agenda provocateurs, and apologists are close to universally ignorant of the general norms of theological interpretation necessary to properly interpret the aforementioned matters.{15}

The above syllabus points could continue to be multiplied. However, let us flip the script. Rather than continuing to draw out this list of previously substantiated points from various site treatments{16}, let us approach the matter differently. For too long, those who have prattled on in varying degrees of ignorance on these matters have been allowed to have a free ride in not being told to fish or cut bait insofar as taking a specific moral stand. I do not mean a moral stand on the bombings issue alone for they have obviously done that -however one assesses the quality or lack thereof of their opposition. No, they have not as a rule taken a stand on what they would have done differently. 

In 1945, there were only three options{17} for how to navigate the end of the Second World War. They were as follows:

• The use of atomic bombs 

• A naval blockade of Imperial Japan 

• A land invasion of Imperial Japan

The pundits, agenda provocateurs, and apologists have made clear their opposition to what happened with Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Therefore, they have to if they are to avoid being credibly charged with unethical cowardice man up and tell us which alternative they would have gone with. 

Would they endorse a massive land invasion of Imperial Japan? 

I have gone over in detail in more than one place{18} what would be involved in the latter. If anything I was far too lenient in how that matter was handled insofar as my estimates did not include anything about how Japanese government officials viewed this matter.{19} So I have to ask if knowing the Japanese leaders themselves were estimating twenty million casualties from an invasion of Imperial Japan, would those who spend seemingly every August{20} wailing and gnashing their teeth in a virtue signalling lather over the atomic bombings have preferred a land invasion instead? Inquiring minds want to know.

Or would they favour a naval blockade of Imperial Japan?

The other option on the table if massive land invasions is not your bag was a US naval blockade of Japan, by preventing access to resources. However, there were many problems with an Allied naval blockade of Japan. The ships would be put within striking range of kamikaze planes which would put many American lives in danger. Blocking resources would essentially just be starving the Japanese who were already in the midst of potential starvation{21} after many food rations were diverted away from civilians to military units.

There was no telling how long a blockade would take to force a surrender of a nation that was willing to do whatever it took to avoid what in their minds was a disgraceful action to even contemplate doing{22} and that is apart from the untold millions who would die in the most horrible of ways if a blockade was even remotely successful to begin with.

The Moral and Ethical Challenge

Making a decision on this matter is both logically as well as ethically required for those who wail and gnash their teeth in virtue signalling moral outrage every year when this issue most frequently comes up. They have foreclosed on the approach that was ultimately utilized so they are left with only two other options from which to choose. It is the height of both moral as well as ethical irresponsibility to merely whine about the atomic bombings without being willing to take a public side on what should have been done from the only other real options left. 

Therefore, until the usual suspects on this issue man up, consider all the pertinent factors, recommend an alternative course of action, and be willing to own whatever disastrous results would occur from the choice they would make, no one with a normal intact functioning brain who takes both history as well as ethics and reality seriously needs to pay these folks even the most cursory levels of respect whatsoever.


Notes:

{1} Excerpt from the Rerum Novarum Note On Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and the Profound Problems With Ivory Tower Revisionist Pontifications (circa August 17, 2005)

{2} See the link in footnote one.

{3} See the link in footnote one.

{4} To list some examples:

Kamikaze suicide attacks, the Rape of Nanking, the campaign in Korea, the Bataan Death March and other atrocities in the Philippines, the fierceness of Island warfare, the mobilization of Okinawa civilians -- including women and children -- to offered physical resistance to US troops, and the inhumane treatment of enemy soldiers and civilians in occupied lands. They even tried and executed American POWs in violation of the Geneva Convention for alleged war crimes... 

[The] Japanese had used American and British POWs along with Chinese civilians for weapons experiments at secret facilities in China. BIOLOGICAL weapons experiments. This was confirmed after the war. Many POWs were placed near bombs that were exploded and where the shrapnel contained disease organisms. They were then allowed to die untreated of the diseases that resulted. 

It was known to American intelligence (though kept secret from the American Public) that the Japanese had released long-range balloons into the Jet Stream carrying explosive payloads to be dropped on the American West Coast. Several of these balloons made it to the US and some did explode causing loss of civilian life and limb. [Excerpt from Rerum Novarum (circa August 18, 2005)]

{5} See the material in footnote four and footnote six from the link in footnote one.

{6} See this thread for details:

Expanding Further on the Subject of Double Effect Viz. the Atomic Bombings (circa August 26, 2005)

{7} To note one not insignificant example of this, see the following thread:

On Making a Valid Argument and Avoiding Argumentation Fallacies (circa September 11, 2005)

Also worth noting is this example of a common problem with dealing with the more vociferous virtue signalling folks on this kind of subject: 

When you take it down to brass tacks, [Name Redacted] does not make his own arguments on the subjects I raised. Instead, he makes a laundry list of people who agree with him irrespective of their actual agendas or the arguments they advance to arrive at their conclusions and opinions. This is nothing more than the fallacious form of appealing to authority which I pointed out in my last posting. And since [Name Redacted] has not to my knowledge interacted with that criticism, it stands to reason that he does not dispute it. Indeed, it is indisputable as anyone even vaguely familiar with how to construct and present a viable argument is well aware. [Excerpt from Rerum Novarum (circa September 6, 2005)]

{8} Hopefully it is clear by what is denoted above why your host and not a few others roll their eyes and have no respect whatsoever for the manner which many ideologues misquote sources to try and fill in for the lacuna of solid arguments for their positions. This is done by neophytes as well as even many seasoned apologists, social commentators, etc so by no means is it a localized problem at all but instead one that is more universal in its scope. And while normally these factors do not come up when dealing with boilerplate issues, with geopolitical matters and more complex moral/ethical matters, there is quite a minefield out there. Far too often (and with an alarming frequency in recent years), seasoned apologists social commentators, etc. have stepped on those mines with regrettable yet predictable results. [Excerpt from Rerum Novarum (circa February 4, 2006)]

{9} Thomas a Kempis once noted something akin to the idea that sometimes for the sake of peace we must give up our opinions. I certainly am not doing that but I am recognizing that I played a role (however reluctantly) in perpetuating what could have been an endless series of "he said-she said" responses. [Excerpt from Rerum Novarum (circa September 12, 2005)]

{10} This is a matter that was discussed more in a dispersed matter touched upon in various threads than in any focused systematical fashion.

{11} This was dealt with in detail many years ago. For a redacted version retaining much of the original substance but with minimal polemic, see this thread:

Revisiting Material From Years Past (circa August 7, 2020)

{12} See footnote eight.

{13} They seem oblivious to the simple fact that "a simple sentence, even spoken by the Sovereign Pontiff, is not an act of the Magisterium; we know that all statements have different degrees of authority"  (Cardinal Dario Castrillo Hoyos to Bishop Bernard Fellay) and furthermore that though "[i]t is always possible to criticize such a statement, as well as a style of governing" (ibid) that nonetheless "[t]he criticism, however, demands an authentic understanding of the thinking of the other person, and should presuppose that he also possess the Catholic faith" (ibid). 

For more on this subject, see the Rerum Novarum exposition On the Magisterium of the Catholic Church, Obedience, and the Requirements of Faithful Catholics published earlier this year.

{14} See footnote thirteen. To note some additional examples from years past as well in order from newest to oldest:

On Magisterial Interpretation (circa January 4, 2020)

On Veritatis Splendor, Gaudium et Spes, and Intrinsic Evil (circa July 27, 2019)

"Dogmatic Theology Five Cents, The Doctor is In" Dept. (circa February 4, 2006)

{15} See footnotes thirteen and fourteen.

{16} Here is the most recent list of such threads grouped together in sequential order:

Website Threads on the Atomic Bomb Subject and Various Factors Involved in Objectively Assessing the Moral and Ethical Ramifications Thereof (circa August 6, 2020)

{17} Well, four if you count surrendering to Dai Nippon or five if you include the latter and also count complete military withdrawal and allowing for a Soviet invasion and occupation. I frankly wonder sometimes if those who constantly carp on this issue would not have preferred one of those options but to anyone with a normal intact functioning brain, those options are no real options at all.

{18} This is covered in a number of places but see the link in footnote one for some of the details.

{19} It's astounding...While we were looking at some of our own casualty estimates, the Japanese military was doing much the same thing, and the figure of 20 million appears again and again.

Giangreco says just the number '20 million' is horrific — but he is most stunned by the casualness with which it was used by Japanese military leaders who felt that the loss of life was worth it. [Excerpt from the NPR Article Hell To Pay' Sheds New Light On A-Bomb Decision (circa January 16, 2010)]

{20} And not just in the month of August even if that has shown to be the most prevalent time for these kinds of subjects to be brought up.

{21} I say "potential starvation" because there are differing schools of thought on if the Japanese people were actually in a starvation situation or not and (if they were) how much of that was due to blockade efforts on incoming supplies and how much was due to poor crops in the 1945 growing season.

{22} See footnotes one and seventeen.

"One From the Vault" Dept.
(Revisiting Material From Years Past)

This thread is a Vault Flashback in general content if not in precise composition. I am seeing the Doug Long sources trotted out by the garden variety virtue signalling sorts as is not uncommon this time of year. As I have responded to these sources in other more polemical contexts, I decided to abridge the prior material, reformulate it in a more irenic fashion, and present it anew. New phrasings to the material below will be in brackets. New footnote material not in the prior version will be in purple font. I will not indicate where prior material was removed. Nor will I link to the prior material here as I have no interest in engaging anew prior timewasters uninterested in genuine dialogue. My sources will again be in darkblue font. Without further ado...

The best and most obvious place from which to start this examination in my humble opinion is with the Supreme Commander of the Pacific himself one General Douglas MacArthur. Doug Long starts his quote-fest by quoting from American Caesar which was William Manchester’s well written biography on the man. As I happen to own the very same William Manchester biography of General MacArthur being cited, I will deal with that source first. Starting on page 510, the following is outlined after discussing the inter-service rivalry between MacArthur, Le May, and Nimitz, the following words from pages 510-511 of American Caesar set the stage for putting Doug Long’s quote into proper context:

Hirohito’s generals, grimly preparing for the invasion, had not abandoned hope of saving their homeland. Although a few strategic islands had been lost, they told each other, most of their conquests, including the Chinese heartland, were firmly in their hands, and the bulk of their army was undefeated. Even now they could scarcely believe that any foe would have the audacity to attempt landings in Japan itself. Allied troops, they boasted, would face the fiercest resistance in history. Over ten thousand kamikaze planes were readied for “Ketsu-Go,” Operation Decision. Behind the beaches, enormous connecting underground caves had been stocked with caches of food and thousands of tons of ammunition. Manning the nation’s ground defenses were 2,350,000 regular soldiers, 250,000 garrison troops, and 32,000,000 civilian militiamen –a total of 34,600,000, more than the combined armies of the United States, Great Britain, and Nazi Germany. All males aged fifteen to sixty, and all females ages seventeen to forty-five, had been conscripted. Their weapons included ancient bronze cannon, muzzle loaded muskets, bamboo spears, and bows and arrows. Even little children had been trained to strap explosives around their waists, roll under tank treads, and blow themselves up. They were called “Sherman’s carpets.”

This was the enemy the Pentagon had learned to fear and hate –a country of fanatics dedicated to hara-kiri, determined to slay as many invaders as possible as they went down fighting. [William Manchester: American Caesar: Douglas MacArthur 1880-1964, pg. 510-511)]

From there the book discusses a dovish contingent that was also present. According to the book (pg. 511) everyone MacArthur talked to in the War Department believed that Japan could hold out for at least two more years. From there, the book quotes some Japanese persons with retrospect statements about how “Japan was finished” all of that is towards the end of page 511 leading into page 512 where the citation from Long is made. I will interact with these quotes shortly but first, here is the passage from pg. 512 as Long quotes it:

"...the Potsdam declaration in July, demand[ed] that Japan surrender unconditionally or face 'prompt and utter destruction.' MacArthur was appalled. He knew that the Japanese would never renounce their emperor, and that without him an orderly transition to peace would be impossible anyhow, because his people would never submit to Allied occupation unless he ordered it. Ironically, when the surrender did come, it was conditional, and the condition was a continuation of the imperial reign. Had the General's advice been followed, the resort to atomic weapons at Hiroshima and Nagasaki might have been unnecessary." [William Manchester, American Caesar: Douglas MacArthur 1880-1964, pg. 512.]

Before supplying the text after the quotation for proper context, I cannot avoid mentioning here that the quote given represents equal parts MacArthur’s outlook and the opinion of the biographer. The latter gives the assertion that "...[h]ad the General's advice been followed, the resort to atomic weapons at Hiroshima and Nagasaki might have been unnecessary” which clearly is a normative argument and thus useless in a discussion of objective facts. Sure it is possible that the bombings may not have been necessary if MacArthur’s advice had been followed but was it probable -that is the question. And in response to the latter I must state for the record that I highly doubt it.

Interestingly enough, Long does not quote the paragraphs immediately following what he does cite which state the following:

In an implacable mood, then, successive versions of “Downfall”, the code name for the invasion of Dai Nippon, were drafted in Washington, and revised in Manila. All of them assumed the worst: that Russian support would be unavailable, that B-29 raids and a naval blockade of Dai Nippon would not be decisive, and that the Manhattan project (of whose existence MacArthur and Nimitz were unaware until late July) would fail to produce practical nuclear fission devices. Germany’s surrender on May 7, 1945, however, guaranteed masses of veteran Allied infantrymen. Thirty divisions were on their way to the Philippines from the ETO. In June, there were 1,400,000 GI’s ready to stage from the archipelago; another 1,000,000 were expected by December. Courtney Hodges, commander of the U.S. First Army already had arrived in Manila but MacArthur still preferred his own field commanders. “Downfall” would begin with “Operation Olympic”, a frontal assault on Kyushu on November 1, 1945, whose purpose would be to secure, in the General’s words “airfields to cover the main assault on Honshu.” The second phase, “Operation Coronet,” the landing on Honshu, would follow on March 1, 1946. He himself probably with Eichelbarger as his chief of staff would lead that.

He had no illusions about the savagery that lay ahead –he told Stimson that Downfall would “cost over a million casualties to American forces alone”—but he was confident that with the tanks from Europe he could outmaneuver the defenders on the great Kanto Plain before Tokyo. Whether he would be as adroit with Eisenhower’s generals –not to mention Ike himself- was another matter. Granting an interview to Bert Andrews of the New York Herald Tribune, he said that the ETO commanders had made “every mistake that supposedly intelligent men could make,” that “the North African operation was absolutely useless,” that “the European strategy was to hammer stupidly against the enemy’s strongest points” and that if he had been given “just a portion of the force” sent to North Africa in 1942, he “could have retaken the Philippines in three months because by then the Japanese were not ready.” [William Manchester: American Caesar: Douglas MacArthur 1880-1964, pg. 512-513]

Now then, having established the sitz im leben of Long’s quotation, let us examine the statements made on the preceding page about the dove contingent. First of all, it bears noting that MacArthur and Nimitz were not aware of the Manhattan Project until late July. The short gap in time between their awareness of the bomb's existence and its actual usage was therefore at most three weeks time. According to Louis Morton's writing The Decision To Use the Atomic Bomb, MacArthur and Nimitz were told of the atomic bombing after July 25, 1945:

In orders issued on 25 July and approved by Stimson and Marshall, Spaatz was ordered to drop the "first special bomb as soon as weather will permit visual bombing after about 3 August 1945 on one of the targets: Hiroshima, Kokura, Niigata and Nagasaki." He was instructed also to deliver a copy of this order personally to MacArthur and Nimitz. [Louis Morton: The Decision To Use the Atomic Bomb pg. 514 (c. 1958)]

The reason I make the assertion that MacArthur and Nimitz were told of the atomic bombing after July 25, 1945 is because with the greatest likelihood -because of the degree of secrecy that surrounded the Manhattan project- that this was the first time that either MacArthur or Nimitz heard about the existence of the bomb itself. If that theory is correct, than they heard about the bomb either on the 25th or (perhaps) the 26th of July in 1945. That would mean that they would have heard of it at the most with twelve days to go before the actual drop on Hiroshima. Considering that both General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz were heavily into planning strategery for the November 1, 1945 Operation Olympic invasion at that time --and what would have been the largest land and sea invasion in history: easily dwarfing Normandy-- they were unlikely to have put much thinking into the use of the bomb and the ramifications involved in said usage at that time.

What was also definitely not correct is the assessment of Japan’s lack of capacity for making war. At this point, we will consider this position as mentioned in the Manchester biography of General MacArthur. To start with, their “production was finished” and they could only “produce war materials for a few days more”, had their “factories bombed out of existence” and had “no raw materials” as Japanese industrialist Ryozo Asano is quoted as saying in May of 1945 (American Caesar pg. 511), then how were the Japanese able to continue the building of carriers and other warships in Hiroshima, various planes and other munitions in Nagasaki which we knew that they were doing?

If they were so incapable of production as Ryozo Asano claimed, then those wily Japanese must have been building their ships from May through August of 1945 out of some kind of pixiedust. Further still, how could they be in the process of producing at that time a jet powered fighter craft that (if they had later managed to put it into service in late 1945 for dealing with the impending US invasion) would have had easy pickings from our convoys of military ships due to its ability to run rings around the best planes that the US military had in service at the time?

Obviously this industrialist did not know what they were talking about viz. the whole of Japan and its capabilities since Hiroshima had not even been touched by bombs in the war nor was (to my knowledge) Nagasaki. Indeed, those targets were chosen not only because they constituted complex military industrial nerve centers of the island’s defense and production plants for the armaments to make war but also because of their pristine conditions viz. the effects of the bombings: they were untouched by any of our bombing runs. This was to show just how formidable this new weapon was –though even as I noted earlier, they knew it would be effective but not to the extent that it actually was.

Considering all of these factors, I am making an educated guess here and presuming that the aforementioned industrialist was from Tokyo, which had been decimated of its military production capacities at the time. If I am right about that, then they accurately assessed things as they were in Tokyo viz. military capacities for production but they had little to no knowledge of the capacities of production plants in cities in the south of Japan.

For more on the above Doug Long, the following observations from “Hiroshima_facts” –an internet interlocutor I will occasionally cite for an alternate take on these matters—is of interest: His words will be in blue font where applicable.

MacArthur's biographer seems ignorant of the reality of the surrender, in which Japan accepted our terms unconditionally, and in which there was no condition guaranteeing imperial reign.

The above points with regards to the surrender are a matter of record and are frankly not even disputable.

We did insist on a condition giving MacArthur the power to depose the Emperor at will though...

The biographer does note that in American Caesar interestingly enough which only underscores how those who make the “retaining-the-Emperor-would-have-resulted-in-an-early-surrender” argument missed the proverbial boat. If they were so concerned about the Emperor –and if they made his retention a matter of non-negotiation previously –then it is strange that they would agree later on to give General MacArthur the power to depose the Emperor at will: a minor matter perhaps but considered in light of everything else I noted above, it does not favour the view of those who have tried to argue against the bombings in the manner outlined above by the biographer.

Moving onto the second quote from MacArthur, we have this one:

Norman Cousins was a consultant to General MacArthur during the American occupation of Japan. Cousins writes of his conversations with MacArthur, "MacArthur's views about the decision to drop the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were starkly different from what the general public supposed." He continues, "When I asked General MacArthur about the decision to drop the bomb, I was surprised to learn he had not even been consulted. What, I asked, would his advice have been? He replied that he saw no military justification for the dropping of the bomb. The war might have ended weeks earlier, he said, if the United States had agreed, as it later did anyway, to the retention of the institution of the emperor. Norman Cousins, The Pathology of Power, pg. 65, 70-71.]

It is obvious that MacArthur was operating from the faulty presumption that “the institution of the emperor” being retained would have resulted in a surrender. I will discuss this factor later on in this thread but not without noting that the Americans could not accept the Japanese idea of “retention of the emperor” which was vastly different from what was eventually accepted after the bombs were dropped.

More could be noted on this but perhaps the clincher is that MacArthur was not to my knowledge ever informed about MAGIC and what we knew from that source. Indeed, the biography I have cited heavily from is copyrighted 1978, which was around the time the first batch of MAGIC was partially declassified.{1} The reasons for the general's ignorance on the matter was twofold.

First of all, President Roosevelt did not want General MacArthur to be too in the loop about this kind of stuff because he was capable of being disobedient to his superiors much the way General George Patton was in the European arena.{2} Secondly, President Truman (who actually served under then-Colonel MacArthur in WWI) was not unfamiliar with MacArthur’s reputation for flouting the commands of higher authorities and was not about to act any differently than Roosevelt had -particularly since General MacArthur had shown his loose-lips capabilities by being openly critical of the way military operations were handled in Europe in not a few ways. He was thus viewed as too much of a loose cannon to be trusted with this kind of delicate information. Nonetheless, considering everything noted above, it is safe to say that General Douglas MacArthur’s view on this matter was grounded on some faulty presuppositions and furthermore was not enlightened by the additional information that President Truman and the War Department possessed via MAGIC.

Let us now look briefly at the Doug Long quotes one by one starting with General Eisenhower:

"...in [July] 1945... Secretary of War Stimson, visiting my headquarters in Germany, informed me that our government was preparing to drop an atomic bomb on Japan. I was one of those who felt that there were a number of cogent reasons to question the wisdom of such an act. ...the Secretary, upon giving me the news of the successful bomb test in New Mexico, and of the plan for using it, asked for my reaction, apparently expecting a vigorous assent.

"During his recitation of the relevant facts, I had been conscious of a feeling of depression and so I voiced to him my grave misgivings, first on the basis of my belief that Japan was already defeated and that dropping the bomb was completely unnecessary, and secondly because I thought that our country should avoid shocking world opinion by the use of a weapon whose employment was, I thought, no longer mandatory as a measure to save American lives. It was my belief that Japan was, at that very moment, seeking some way to surrender with a minimum loss of 'face'. The Secretary was deeply perturbed by my attitude..." - Dwight Eisenhower, Mandate For Change, pg. 380

In a Newsweek interview, Eisenhower again recalled the meeting with Stimson: "...the Japanese were ready to surrender and it wasn't necessary to hit them with that awful thing." - Ike on Ike, Newsweek, 11/11/63

As I have pointed out in not a few threads [in years past], the presumption that the Japanese were ready to surrender was an erroneous notion. Furthermore, as I noted in dealing with the MacArthur quotes, the MAGIC cables do not appear to be anything that General Eisenhower knew anything about. He may have known about Venona at the time due to his status as Supreme Commander in Europe but Venona was Soviet-focused and had nothing to do with what happened in the Pacific arena. Indeed, by the time he would have learned about these things as president, he would not have had time to go back and review stuff from 1945 as he had a country to run by that point after all. And (of course) in 1963 he was out of the loop completely and could not have accessed them even if he was inclined to.

The following observations from the aforementioned internet interlocutor “Hiroshima_facts” are also of interest on these issues:

Funny how Stimson, who always recorded dissent from officials regarding the bombs, failed to record anything about Ike.

Even funnier how Ike's own early depictions of the encounter claimed that he did not voice any vehement objection.

As what is noted in the above paragraphs are adequate to deal with the quotes from General (later President) Eisenhower on the matter, let us move from the two Supreme Commanders to the former president Herbert Hoover. In Doug Long's citations, we see the following:

Herbert Hoover

On May 28, 1945, Hoover visited President Truman and suggested a way to end the Pacific war quickly: "I am convinced that if you, as President, will make a shortwave broadcast to the people of Japan - tell them they can have their Emperor if they surrender, that it will not mean unconditional surrender except for the militarists - you'll get a peace in Japan - you'll have both wars over." Richard Norton Smith, An Uncommon Man: The Triumph of Herbert Hoover, pg. 347.

This is of course is what is called normative argumentation since Hoover was giving his opinion on the matter. We do not see anything to substantiate said opinion and furthermore, we already know that the Japanese insisted on retaining the Emperor but not in the fashion he was eventually retained.

On August 8, 1945, after the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, Hoover wrote to Army and Navy Journal publisher Colonel John Callan O'Laughlin, "The use of the atomic bomb, with its indiscriminate killing of women and children, revolts my soul." quoted from Gar Alperovitz, The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb, pg. 635.

I have dealt [in the past] with this canard in a posting on double effect so I will not reiterate it here.

"...the Japanese were prepared to negotiate all the way from February 1945...up to and before the time the atomic bombs were dropped; ...if such leads had been followed up, there would have been no occasion to drop the [atomic] bombs." quoted by Barton Bernstein in Philip Nobile, ed., Judgment at the Smithsonian, pg. 142

Of course they were prepared to negotiate. However, they were also “prepar[ing] to negotiate” prior to Pearl Harbour…something that not a few people seem to conveniently forget. However, I for one have not.

It bears remembering that President Hoover was not in the loop on MAGIC so that needs to be taken into account as well when assessing his posited opinion above –indeed the aforementioned internet interlocutor “Hiroshima_facts” points this out as well:

That's not what the MAGIC summaries were indicating to Truman.

The Japanese government did not get behind the negotiation gambit until August 2nd, 1945.

All of that is true and verifiable by the evidences. The next bit from “Hiroshima_facts” is subjective but I will post it nonetheless since it represents a MAGIC-informed opinion[:]

At any rate, the war wasn't going to end with negotiations. The only way it could end was with Japan accepting all our terms unconditionally.

Of course that is not all that the former president had to say:

Hoover biographer Richard Norton Smith has written: "Use of the bomb had besmirched America's reputation, he [Hoover] told friends. It ought to have been described in graphic terms before being flung out into the sky over Japan." Richard Norton Smith, An Uncommon Man: The Triumph of Herbert Hoover, pg. 349-350.

Once again we have normative argumentation. The late President apparently forgot that we did not know the full extent of the bomb’s power beforehand…we knew it was superior to anything ever used before but insofar as its precise power we did not know. It is always easy to play “second guess” in retrospect but that game is subjective in nature and does not actually solve anything.

In early May of 1946 Hoover met with General Douglas MacArthur. Hoover recorded in his diary, "I told MacArthur of my memorandum of mid-May 1945 to Truman, that peace could be had with Japan by which our major objectives would be accomplished. MacArthur said that was correct and that we would have avoided all of the losses, the Atomic bomb, and the entry of Russia into Manchuria." Gar Alperovitz, The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb, pg. 350-351.

I have already dealt with General MacArthur’s statements in this thread so I will not repeat them here. Furthermore, I have effectively disqualified former President Hoover as a credible authority on these matters so no more needs to be said about those assertions.  I also [dealt with] Col. Carter Clarke’s quote from an earlier posting.{3} Indeed, so many of the rest of Long's quotes from Einstein (scientist) to Nitze (Air Force) to Szilard (scientist) to General Spaatz (Air Force) were not privy to the MAGIC cables so they are easily dismissed on that score as not credible due to lack of key information on the matter. I will therefore touch on some of them only briefly here, starting with Paul Nitze.

First of all, he was in the Air Force so he knew nothing about MAGIC. That is the first strike against him as a credible source. The following points from the aforementioned internet interlocutor “Hiroshima_facts” are also quite interesting –pertaining as they do to Paul Nitze’s position:

The Strategic Bombing Survey was Air Force propaganda that tried to claim that conventional heavy bombers would have won the war on their own, and so should receive the most funding from Congress in an era of rapidly shrinking post-war defense budgets.

Now as far as I know, that is an accurate assertion to some extent -a bit exaggerated perhaps but the essence of the statement is accurate. Furthermore, I have already dealt with the rivalry element of the different armed service divisions as well as pointed out that the Air Force had no familiarity with the contents of the MAGIC cable intercepts after at least February of 1942 –the decoding of various portions being the job of the Army and Navy branches after that time. The Air Force was actually in favour of approaches such as firebombing (as advocated by General Curtis Le May) so I will not say anything more than that. Nonetheless, that is adequate to dispatch with Paul Nitze.

With regards to Joseph Grew (another supposed "authority" posited by Doug Long), I will defer to the internet interlocutor “Hiroshima_facts” on Joseph Grew before addressing this matter myself.

Something most people miss about Grew's suggestion. He was suggesting we allow Hirohito's son to be Emperor under a constitutional monarchy, not suggesting a guarantee for Hirohito himself.

Those who want to review Grew’s comments to check to see if that interpretation is viable are free to do so. It appears correct to me since Grew refers to the "[retention of the] dynasty" which does not necessarily mean Hirohito himself. Here they are from Doug Long's files:

Joseph Grew
(Under Sec. of State)

In a February 12, 1947 letter to Henry Stimson (Sec. of War during WWII), Grew responded to the defense of the atomic bombings Stimson had made in a February 1947 Harpers magazine article:

"...in the light of available evidence I myself and others felt that if such a categorical statement about the [retention of the] dynasty had been issued in May, 1945, the surrender-minded elements in the [Japanese] Government might well have been afforded by such a statement a valid reason and the necessary strength to come to an early clearcut decision.

Anyone can say something after the fact. Why on earth this should be considered a solid piece of evidence is a mystery to me. Moving on...

"If surrender could have been brought about in May, 1945, or even in June or July, before the entrance of Soviet Russia into the [Pacific] war and the use of the atomic bomb, the world would have been the gainer." Grew quoted in Barton Bernstein, ed.,The Atomic Bomb, pg. 29-32.

And if there were real leprechans and pots of gold at the end of the rainbow, that would be great too. Honestly, it is quite evident that Grew was ignorant of the MAGIC cables just by the idiotic statements he made above. But let us first review the words of John McCloy which are similarly misguided before we address both of them with some explication on the subject at hand.

John McCloy
(Assistant Sec. of War)

"I have always felt that if, in our ultimatum to the Japanese government issued from Potsdam [in July 1945], we had referred to the retention of the emperor as a constitutional monarch and had made some reference to the reasonable accessibility of raw materials to the future Japanese government, it would have been accepted. Indeed, I believe that even in the form it was delivered, there was some disposition on the part of the Japanese to give it favorable consideration. When the war was over I arrived at this conclusion after talking with a number of Japanese officials who had been closely associated with the decision of the then Japanese government, to reject the ultimatum, as it was presented. I believe we missed the opportunity of effecting a Japanese surrender, completely satisfactory to us, without the necessity of dropping the bombs." McCloy quoted in James Reston, Deadline, pg. 500.

And this was also wishful thinking. As the very well-read (and MAGIC-informed) historian Richard Frank correctly noted on the whole question of a Japanese surrender:

The Japanese government retained two minimal war aims: preservation both (1) of the Imperial Institution and (2) of the old order in Japan in which the militarists were dominant. They were not just seeking a guarantee of the imperial institution with a figurehead emperor as is often argued. The U.S. war aim of "unconditional surrender" was not merely a hollow wartime slogan. By 1945, it formed an essential element in an overall vision for an enduring peace. "Unconditional surrender" meant the U.S. would secure the legal authority to conduct a complete renovation of Japan to eradicate the old order and assure that Japan never again launched a war of aggression.

Given these minimal war aims on both sides, diplomacy could not work because there was no common ground for compromise between the continuation and the extinction of the old order in Japan. As the [PBS] program noted, even after the atomic bombs and Soviet entry, the Japanese cabinet deadlocked, with the hard liners still holding out for terms including no occupation -- and no occupation means no occupation reforms. As the program further highlighted, as late as the first Japanese peace offer of August 10, 1945, they were still demanding that the U.S. grant real, substantive power to the emperor so that he could veto occupation reforms and defeat the American aim of eradicating the old order in Japan. While critics speak broadly about backing away from or even dropping "unconditional surrender" they have not, to the best of my knowledge, set forth precisely how this could be accomplished and still allow the U.S. to conduct the occupation and the ensuing reforms that produced the peaceful Japan that has exited since 1945. Thus, insisting on "unconditional surrender" was not merely a matter of pride or some perverted American version of "face"; it was the key to the enduring peace. [Richard Frank: Victory in the Pacific from the thread Was there a real strategic reason for the bombing of Nagasaki? (circa May 3, 2005)]

That is more than adequate to dispatch with the fantasies of John McCloy and Joseph Grew on this matter as any kinds of "authority" to use in supporting one's argumentation. But we are not done yet as there are a couple more to tend to.

Admiral William Leahy
(Chief of Staff to Presidents Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman)

"It is my opinion that the use of this barbarous weapon at Hiroshima and Nagasaki was of no material assistance in our war against Japan. The Japanese were already defeated and ready to surrender because of the effective sea blockade and the successful bombing with conventional weapons.

I have gone over in detail [in years past] why this presumption (that Japan was already defeated and ready to surrender) was false. I will now supplement my arguments by referring the reader back to my previous citation from the historian Richard Frank. There is also these points to take into consideration on the matter:

That diplomacy offered no prospect of success was made clear to American leaders by the daily Magic Diplomatic Summary covering the decoded Japanese diplomatic communications. Copies of each day's edition were distributed to a select band of American policy makers, with the president at the top of the list. The intercepts first of all established that the diplomats of foreign (neutral) governments in Japan were reporting to their own governments by a three or four to one ratio that it was clear to them that the Japanese had no intention of surrendering and meant to fight on to the end. The intercepts next demonstrated that a half dozen or so Japanese diplomats, including military and naval attaches in Europe, who attempted to approach American officials to initiate negotiations all lacked actual authority from the Japanese government for their actions.

The Magic Diplomatic Summary demonstrated that the sole Japanese diplomatic effort that carried the actual sanction of any real authority in Japan was an effort to secure Soviet good offices to mediate an end to the war on terms acceptable to Japan. It was not, as it is sometimes represented, just an effort to have the Soviets act as a postman to deliver a "we surrender" note. The man who was supposed to present this proposal to the Soviets and secure their good offices was the Japanese Ambassador in Moscow, Sato Naotake. When you read as American officials did Sato's comments, you see clearly the diplomatic initiative was not serious. [ibid.]

It seems to me that Admiral Leahy's opinion was summarized well in the following part of the text:

"The lethal possibilities of atomic warfare in the future are frightening. My own feeling was that in being the first to use it, we had adopted an ethical standard common to the barbarians of the Dark Ages. I was not taught to make war in that fashion, and wars cannot be won by destroying women and children." - William Leahy, I Was There, pg. 441.

Of course retrospect has shown us that the use of those bombs not only brought a quick end to the war and saved lives on both sides –as I noted in [years past] –as that there have been no subsequent atomic or nuclear weapons which have been used in warfare. Indeed, we even test them underground because of the knowledge of the radiation effects now, which was not available to us back then. As far as the claim that we were "making war” by "destroying women and children” I refer the readers to what I outlined in the double effect posting [and also advise greater care in considering the factor of conscription].

To second (to some extent) my position on Admiral Leahy, I again refer to the interlocutor “Hiroshima_facts” who correctly notes the following:

This is a post WWII position, not a WWII position as claimed above.

And whether or not that is true or not is of course debatable. I have already noted the problem with retrospective argumentation so the viability of that last Leahy quote is at least called into question and thus cannot be viewed as a piece of evidence to establish an argument upon. And (of course) what is not debatable is that Admiral Leahy was presenting a normative argument on the matter [which is of course subjective not objective in nature].

More could be noted but I think it is clear how so many of those who are cited as “proofs” do not stack up for reasons I have noted above. Frankly, I do not see much in the other statements [frequently] cited from Doug Long that is not one giant normative argument and those will not do for reasons I already cited. But (of course) I have done more than merely assert it but indeed have interacted with all of the names on the list who were of any position to potentially have access to all the pertinent information. There is but one more remaining and that is Ralph Bard and he will be dealt with next...

Ralph Bard
(Under Sec. of the Navy)

On June 28, 1945, a memorandum written by Bard the previous day was given to Sec. of War Henry Stimson. It stated, in part:

"Following the three-power [July 1945 Potsdam] conference emissaries from this country could contact representatives from Japan somewhere on the China Coast and make representations with regard to Russia's position [they were about to declare war on Japan] and at the same time give them some information regarding the proposed use of atomic power, together with whatever assurances the President might care to make with regard to the [retention of the] Emperor of Japan and the treatment of the Japanese nation following unconditional surrender. It seems quite possible to me that this presents the opportunity which the Japanese are looking for.

We know of course that even after the bombs were dropped that the Japanese War Cabinet was considering four conditions prior to Hirohito's intervention. One of them was the retention of the Emperor this is true but not in the fashion that the bureaucrats like Bard were naively presuming. Furthermore, there was also the elements of (i) no occupation and (ii) voluntary disarmament in the mix. It is absurd to suggest that the Japanese would have settled for less before the bombings than they were seeking afterwards and (if not for Hirohito's intervention) they would with the greatest of likelihood not have budged from that position -particularly the ones on no occupation and veto power for the emperor over any US reconstruction ideas.

"I don't see that we have anything in particular to lose in following such a program." He concluded the memorandum by noting, "The only way to find out is to try it out." Memorandum on the Use of S-1 Bomb, Manhattan Engineer District Records, Harrison-Bundy files, folder # 77, National Archives (also contained in: Martin Sherwin, A World Destroyed, 1987 edition, pg. 307-308).

See my previous comments.

Later Bard related, "...it definitely seemed to me that the Japanese were becoming weaker and weaker. They were surrounded by the Navy. They couldn't get any imports and they couldn't export anything. Naturally, as time went on and the war developed in our favor it was quite logical to hope and expect that with the proper kind of a warning the Japanese would then be in a position to make peace, which would have made it unnecessary for us to drop the bomb and have had to bring Russia in...". quoted in Len Giovannitti and Fred Freed, The Decision To Drop the Bomb, pg. 144-145, 324.

The naiveity of the above statement is amazing!!! Furthermore, it ignores the fact that a wounded animal often fights with even greater ferocity and the Japanese were certainly wounded. The Navy had yet to face the full brunt of 10,000 kamikaze planes and I guarantee that the Japanese would have sooner chose that route than surrender: a concept foreign to their 2000 year history and something that those who opined on them surrendering never seemed to take into consideration.

Bard also asserted, "I think that the Japanese were ready for peace, and they already had approached the Russians and, I think, the Swiss. And that suggestion of [giving] a warning [of the atomic bomb] was a face-saving proposition for them, and one that they could have readily accepted." He continued, "In my opinion, the Japanese war was really won before we ever used the atom bomb. Thus, it wouldn't have been necessary for us to disclose our nuclear position and stimulate the Russians to develop the same thing much more rapidly than they would have if we had not dropped the bomb." War Was Really Won Before We Used A-Bomb, U.S. News and World Report, 8/15/60, pg. 73-75.

See my previous citation from Richard Frank on the "surrender attempt to the Russians" red herring pro-offered by Bard above.{4} Moving on we come to this final thread from Lewis Strauss:

Lewis Strauss
Special Assistant to the Sec. of the Navy)

Strauss recalled a recommendation he gave to Sec. of the Navy James Forrestal before the atomic bombing of Hiroshima:

"I proposed to Secretary Forrestal that the weapon should be demonstrated before it was used. Primarily it was because it was clear to a number of people, myself among them, that the war was very nearly over. The Japanese were nearly ready to capitulate... My proposal to the Secretary was that the weapon should be demonstrated over some area accessible to Japanese observers and where its effects would be dramatic. I remember suggesting that a satisfactory place for such a demonstration would be a large forest of cryptomeria trees not far from Tokyo. The cryptomeria tree is the Japanese version of our redwood... I anticipated that a bomb detonated at a suitable height above such a forest... would lay the trees out in windrows from the center of the explosion in all directions as though they were matchsticks, and, of course, set them afire in the center. It seemed to me that a demonstration of this sort would prove to the Japanese that we could destroy any of their cities at will... Secretary Forrestal agreed wholeheartedly with the recommendation..."

I have already outlined in detail why the above opinions (about the Japanese being "nearly ready to capitulate" are the exact opposite of what was reflected in the MAGIC summaries. If [anyone] wants to explain why such ill-informed so-called "experts" are still viable for this discussion [they] can feel free to.{5} I am confident though that the casual readers can put things together and see why they are not[.]

Strauss added, "It seemed to me that such a weapon was not necessary to bring the war to a successful conclusion, that once used it would find its way into the armaments of the world...". quoted in Len Giovannitti and Fred Freed, The Decision To Drop the Bomb, pg. 145, 325.

We know of course via the MAGIC Russian cryptological branch of MAGIC called Venona that the Russians had already hacked into the Manhattan Project so the idea that somehow the weapon would have not been put into the arsenals of the world's powers if we had not used it in WWII is pathetically naive at best.

In summary, every single so-called "authority" cited from Doug Long fails and fails badly to be a credible source on this subject for reasons I have detailed in this thread. 

Addendum:

For further reading on the subject of attempted historical revisionism at the 1995 Smithsonian Exhibit, see this very good article. Readers who recognize in there some of the names I have just been critical of can consider the additional arguments in that thread as supplements to my own in this thread.

Notes:

{1} They would not be fully declassified until 1995 as a result of the tireless efforts of the late New York Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan.

{2} I will not go into the problems that General Eisenhower had with General Patton and who I side with on that issue as it is not germane to this discussion.

{3} There is also the issue of context in that we only have one source verifying the position of Brigader General Carter Clarke as being involved with MAGIC. We do not know from this whether or not he was in that position at the time of the bomb droppings or not. This is highly improbable for reasons I will not outline in brief.

To start with, at one point, all the intelligence cabels from MAGIC were under the same umbrella of control if you will but that changed in the early 1940's. The signal date of sorts was February 2, 1943: the date when there was a division made within the MAGIC cooperative of sorts by President Franklin Roosevelt. The divisions were along military service lines. Starting on February 2, 1943, the Navy was placed solely in charge of the Japanese intelligence cabels (their decoding, etc.) while the Army was given a new assignment altogether. Then-Colonel Carter Clark was the founder of Venona or the Russian chryptological branch of MAGIC charged with working on Soviet decoding. The agency under which that decoding was to take place was renamed the Signal Security Agency (SSA). This is not insignificant when you consider that [Doug Long quoted] a second hand source from Brigader General Carter Clarke on Hiroshima fourteen years after the fact. For those who missed the problem with this source being cited, I will reiterate it at this time.

First of all, Carter Clarke was not a Brigader General in 1945 but was instead a colonel. And as he was in the Army and assigned to head up SSA in early 1943, Colonel Clarke would not have overseen the dispatches on the Japanese from at least early 1943 onward. The reason of course should be obvious: he was the founder of the Venona branch of the MAGIC network and the Army had no involvement in the Japanese decoding from that point onward. Colonel Clarke worked on Venona from February 2, 1943 through at least October of 1949...I am uncertain as to if he was involved with Venona past that point. Nonetheless, it is not even deniable that Colonel Carter Clarke was involved in the founding of Venona in early 1943 and that with Venona, Colonel Clarke was involved with Soviet cabels not Japanese ones. For this reason, citing him as MAGIC operative in the position as Doug Long does (in the context of Pacific Theatre codebreaking and information gathering under MAGIC) is very sloppy scholarship (to put it nicely). [Substantially Cited From a Rerum Novarum Posting (circa August 28, 2005)] 

{4} Also worth considering is this observation from Austin Hoyt:

People who argue Japan was about to surrender also ignore the military intercepts which indicate an increase in the divisions defending the invasion beaches on the southern island of Kyushu from three in June to nine in July to 13 in early August and a fight to the death attitude on the part of the Imperial Army. [Austin Hoyt: Victory in the Pacific from the thread Are there historians who believe that the atomic bombs were not justified? (circa May 2, 2005)]

Those who recognize those military numbers as being from [past material I wrote] are correct. I did not get them from Austin Hoyt or even from the Truman library but they are common facts for those marginally familiar with these subjects.

{5} Provided of course that they actually demonstrate their assertions rather than merely make assertions –as anyone can do the latter. 

Preparing to walk
Morning therapy session
When not humid out

Threads on the Atomic Bomb Subject and Various Factors Involved in Objectively Assessing the Moral and Ethical Ramifications Thereof:
(A Rerum Novarum Recapitulation Thread)

I posted a longer variation of this thread eleven years ago with a specific purpose in mind.{1} I may have a different purpose this time{2} depending on my mood, time available, and other factors.{3}

Without further ado...

2005:

On Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and the Profound Problems With Ivory Tower Revisionist Pontifications (circa August 17, 2005)

Some Feedback on the "Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and the Profound Problems With Ivory Tower Revisionist Pontifications" Thread (From Dr. Art Sippo circa August 18, 2005)

More Feedback on the "Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and the Profound Problems With Ivory Tower Revisionist Pontifications" Thread (From Tim Tull circa August 19, 2005)

More Feedback on the "Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and the Profound Problems With Ivory Tower Revisionist Pontificatons" Thread (From Tim Tull on Dr. Sippo's Email circa August 21, 2005)

Points to Ponder --On the Atomic Bombs and Their Usage (By Dr. Art Sippo circa August 22, 2005)

And Yet More Feedback on the "Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and the Profound Problems With Ivory Tower Revisionist Pontifications" Thread (circa August 25, 2005)

And More Feedback on the "Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and the Profound Problems With Ivory Tower Revisionist Pontifications" Thread (circa August 26, 2005)

And Yet Still More Feedback on the "Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and the Profound Problems With Ivory Tower Revisionist Pontifications" Thread (circa August 26, 2005)

Expanding Futher on the Subject of Double Effect Viz. the Atomic Bombings (circa August 26, 2005)

Clarifying Some Additional Points on the Atomic Bombing Subject With Dave Armstrong (circa August 28, 2005)

"Armstrong Illusions" Dept. --Part I of II (circa September 6, 2005)

"Armstrong Illusions" Dept. --Part II of II (circa September 6, 2005)

Points to Ponder --On Appealing to Authority in Argumentation (circa September 9, 2005)

Briefly on Making a Valid Argument and Avoiding Argumentation Fallacies (circa September 11, 2005)

"Exit Stage Left" Dept. (circa September 12, 2005)

Abstract Theorizing and Hypothetical Wartime Situations With SecretAgentMan--Parts I-II (circa September 20, 2005; September 23, 2005)


2006:

"Armstrong Illusions" Revisited (circa January 23, 2006)

Guest Editorial on the Atomic Bombings, the Continued Emphasis on it Publicly by Certain Apologists, and the Goal of Catholic Apologetics--By Dr. Art Sippo (circa January 26, 2006)

A Followup Guest Editorial on the Atomic Bombings, the Continued Emphasis on it Publicly by Certain Apologists, and the Goal of Catholic Apologetics--By Dr. Art Sippo (circa January 31, 2006)

Naked Anticipation -A Poem by Albert Cipriani (circa January 31, 2006)

Some Wrapup Comments on the Previous Guest Editorial (circa January 31, 2006)

On Gaudium et Spes and General Norms of Interpretation (circa February 4, 2006)

Responding to Various Assertions (circa March 12, 2006)

Some Core Problems With Apologetics Methodology (circa August 5, 2006)

Core Problems With Apologetics Methodology Revisited With Apolonio Latar III (circa August 14, 2006)

Setting the Record Straight on Old Controversies (circa August 16, 2006)

Highlighting a Key Problem With Apologetics Methodology With Jimmy Akin (circa November 28, 2006)


2007:

On General Norms of Theological Interpretation (circa April 27, 2007)

From the Mailbag (circa May 17, 2007)

On the Morality of Using Atomic Bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the Use of Atomic Bombs in General -Outline for a Possible Dialogue in August of 2007 (circa July 22, 2007)

Dispatching Easily With Three Critics -aka "Ducks on the Pond Dept." (circa July 27, 2007)

On A Key Principle Pertaining to the Hiroshima and Nagasaki Incidents From 1945 -A Rerum Novarum Miscellaneous BLOG Post (circa July 31, 2007)

Miscellaneous Musings (circa August 4, 2007)

Clearing the Ground for a Real Dialogue on the Atomic Bombings (circa August 6, 2007)


2008:

In lieu of what we outlined recently about the wheres (and most of the whys) of the change in direction and emphasis of this weblog which has officially taken place, it seems opportune to note for readers of this humble weblog some of the upcoming projects from the various previously-intended ones which we plan to complete for posting in the coming days, weeks, months, etc of this humble weblog...

...

--A dialogue on the moral and ethical principles behind the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki if the previously-agreed upon dialogual format is still acceptable to the party who accepted my invitation of the previous year and met the minimal requirements requested thereof.[...]

--A thread written with the latter project in mind which may be formatted into a general principle statement apart from that project -in content the two threads would be substantially the same even verbatim in spots but each will pertain to a somewhat different (even if somewhat related by logical extension) context. [Excerpt from Rerum Novarum (circa February 21, 2008)]

My Preliminary Musings on the Anniversary of Hiroshima, on Revisiting This Subject, and on "Blackadder" (circa August 6, 2008)

Some Additional Musings on the Subject of the Atomic Bombings Subject and the Importance of Doing My Part to Facilitate Potentially Fruitful Dialogue (circa August 7, 2008)

Principles of Proper Dialogue -Part of a 2007 Joint Declaration by Shawn and "Blackadder" (circa August 10, 2008)

Response to "Blackadder" on the Atomic Bombings -Part I (circa August 14, 2008)

Response to "Blackadder" on the Atomic Bombings -Part II (circa August 23, 2008)


2017:

Briefly on War Atrocities, History, Selective Outrage, Etc. (circa April 18, 2017)

Commemorating A Controversial Anniversary (circa August 17, 2017)

2018:

Briefly (circa July 31, 2018)


2019:

On a Possible Revisitation of Atomic August (circa August 1, 2019)

Briefly (circa August 17, 2019)

Briefly (circa August 21, 2019)

On the Status of This Year's Atomic August (circa August 30, 2019)


Notes:

{1} This posting will stand in perpetuity as all I intend to say on this subject both to the present time and likely in the years to follow.

All things to the contrary notwithstanding. [Excerpt from Rerum Novarum (circa August 6, 2009)]

{2} On a Possible Revisitation of Atomic August (circa August 1, 2019)

{3} This remains to be seen.