Points to Ponder:
A nation which can prefer disgrace to danger is prepared for a master, and deserves one.[Alexander Hamilton]
I have been saying something eerily similar about Chief Justice John Roberts for a long time. One point this article notes that I had not considered is reading the Chief Justice's concurrence on Citizens United as a template for how he would approach cases like Casey and possibly Roe as well.
I sent a small squadron of frigates into the Mediterranean, with assurances to that power of our sincere desire to remain in peace, but with orders to protect our commerce against the threatened attack. The measure was seasonable and salutary. The Bey had already declared war. His cruisers were out. Two had arrived at Gibraltar. Our commerce in the Mediterranean was blockaded and that of the Atlantic in peril.
The arrival of our squadron dispelled the danger. One of the Tripolitan cruisers having fallen in with and engaged the small schooner Enterprise, commanded by Lieutenant Sterret, which had gone as a tender to our larger vessels, was captured, after a heavy slaughter of her men, without the loss of a single 1 on our part. The bravery exhibited by our citizens on that element will, I trust, be a testimony to the world that it is not the want of that virtue which makes us seek their peace, but a conscientious desire to direct the energies of our nation to the multiplication of the human race, and not to its destruction.He then went on to mention that he had gone as far as he could without congressional authorization of further action:
Unauthorized by the Constitution, without the sanction of Congress, to go beyond the line of defense, the vessel, being disabled from committing further hostilities, was liberated with its crew.
The Legislature will doubtless consider whether, by authorizing measures of offense also, they will place our force on an equal footing with that of its adversaries. I communicate all material information on this subject, that in the exercise of this important function confided by the Constitution to the Legislature exclusively their judgment may form itself on a knowledge and consideration of every circumstances of weight.Notice how President Jefferson mentioned "authorizing measures of offense" and not specifically "a declaration of war"? And if you look at the entire text of his State of the Union address, there is never a mention of pirates anywhere in the text. The reason is this was not a matter of a stray ship or two but instead an actual state or nation we were dealing with here{12} and the piracy clause is not something that dealt with nations. Furthermore, the piracy clause was offensive in nature insofar that it allowed for not only defining piracy but also punishing it which involves an active or offensive element. But if you read President Jefferson's State of the Union, he took merely defensive actions. Therefore, President Jefferson did not have recourse to the Constitution's "Piracy" clause or feel that he was authorized to act under it in this instance. It stands therefore to look at if the Congress authorized any offensive action under the Constitution's "Piracy" clause since we all know they issued no formal declaration of war. Here is the relevant text of the Congress' authorization of President Jefferson to take offensive measures against the regency of Tripoli and its Bey.
An early controversy revolved about the issue of the President's powers and the necessity of congressional action when hostilities are initiated against us rather than the Nation instituting armed conflict. The Bey of Tripoli, in the course of attempting to extort payment for not molesting United States shipping, declared war upon the United States, and a debate began whether Congress had to enact a formal declaration of war to create a legal status of war. President Jefferson sent a squadron of frigates to the Mediterranean to protect our ships but limited its mission to defense in the narrowest sense of the term. Attacked by a Tripolitan cruiser, one of the frigates subdued it, disarmed it, and, pursuant to instructions, released it. Jefferson in a message to Congress announced his actions as in compliance with constitutional limitations on his authority in the absence of a declaration of war. Hamilton espoused a different interpretation, contending that the Constitution vested in Congress the power to initiate war but that when another nation made war upon the United States we were already in a state of war and no declaration by Congress was needed. Congress thereafter enacted a statute authorizing the President to instruct the commanders of armed vessels of the United States to seize all vessels and goods of the Bey of Tripoli "and also to cause to be done all such other acts of precaution or hostility as the state of war will justify . . ." But no formal declaration of war was passed, Congress apparently accepting Hamilton's view. [LINK]It was not long after Congress voted on what we would call today an "authorization to use force" to give President Jefferson the sanction to take offensive measures against the Dey. The aforementioned measure included authorizing President Jefferson to instruct armed American vessel commanders to seize the vessels of the Dey as well as all his goods and also "to cause to be done all such other acts of precaution or hostility as the state of war will justify."
"The whole powers of war being by the Constitution of the United States vested in Congress, the acts of that body can alone be resorted to as our guides in this inquiry. It is not denied, nor in the course of the argument has it been denied, that Congress may authorize general hostilities, in which case the general laws of war apply to our situation, or partial hostilities, in which case the laws of war, so far as they actually apply to our situation, must be noticed."Notice the delineation that Marshall makes between "general hostilities"{15} or "partial hostilities."{16}
Points to Ponder:
Can the liberties of a nation be thought secure, when we have removed their only firm basis, a conviction in the minds of the people that these liberties are the gift of God? That they are not to be violated but with his wrath? Indeed I tremble for my country when I reflect that God is just: that his justice can not sleep forever [Thomas Jefferson]
It is a signal advantage of taxes on articles of consumption, that they contain in their own nature a security against excess. They prescribe their own limit; which cannot be exceeded without defeating the end proposed, that is, an extension of the revenue. When applied to this object, the saying is as just as it is witty, that, "in political arithmetic, two and two do not always make four." If duties are too high, they lessen the consumption; the collection is eluded; and the product to the treasury is not so great as when they are confined within proper and moderate bounds. This forms a complete barrier against any material oppression of the citizens by taxes of this class, and is itself a natural limitation of the power of imposing them.
Impositions of this kind usually fall under the denomination of indirect taxes, and must for a long time constitute the chief part of the revenue raised in this country. Those of the direct kind, which principally relate to land and buildings, may admit of a rule of apportionment. Either the value of land, or the number of the people, may serve as a standard. The state of agriculture and the populousness of a country have been considered as nearly connected with each other. And, as a rule, for the purpose intended, numbers, in the view of simplicity and certainty, are entitled to a preference. In every country it is a herculean task to obtain a valuation of the land; in a country imperfectly settled and progressive in improvement, the difficulties are increased almost to impracticability. The expense of an accurate valuation is, in all situations, a formidable objection. In a branch of taxation where no limits to the discretion of the government are to be found in the nature of things, the establishment of a fixed rule, not incompatible with the end, may be attended with fewer inconveniences than to leave that discretion altogether at large.{8}
Resolved, That we, the Democracy of the Union in Convention assembled, hereby declare our affirmance of the resolutions unanimously adopted and declared as a platform of principles by the Democratic Convention at Cincinnati, in the year 1856, believing that Democratic principles are unchangeable in their nature, when applied to the same subject matters; and we recommend, as the only further resolutions, the following:Since the 1860 platform was mostly that of the 1856 convention with a few addendums, lets look at how many times slavery popped up in the 1856 platform now shall we?
Resolved, That we reiterate with renewed energy of purpose the well-considered declarations of former conventions upon the sectional issue of domestic slavery, and concerning the reserved rights of the states—I am sure the slaves were happy about the arrangement. Moving on...
1. That Congress has no power under the constitution to interfere with or control the domestic institutions of the several states, and that all such states are the sole and proper judges of everything appertaining to their own affairs not prohibited by the constitution; that all efforts of the Abolitionists or others, made to induce Congress to interfere with questions of slavery, or to take incipient steps in relation thereto, are calculated to lead to the most alarming and dangerous consequences, and that all such efforts have an inevitable tendency to diminish the happiness of the people and endanger the stability and permanency of the Union, and ought not to be countenanced by any friend of our political institutions.
2. That the foregoing proposition covers and was intended to embrace the whole subject of slavery agitation in Congress, and therefore the Democratic party of the Union, standing on this national platform, will abide by and adhere to a faithful execution of the acts known as the compromise measures, settled by the Congress of 1850—"the act for reclaiming fugitives from service or labor" included; which act, being designed to carry out an express provision of the constitution, can not, with fidelity thereto, be repealed, or so changed as to destroy or impair its efficiency.So first Congress has no authority on the matter and now they claim they will follow the compromise measure from 1850 set forth by that same Congress. To paraphrase the milk campaign: Got hypocrisy?
3. That the Democratic party will resist all attempts at renewing in Congress, or out of it, the agitation of the slavery question, under whatever shape or color the attempt may be made.Gee, there is sure a lot of talk about slavery for a party and a group of the country that did not fight to protect slavery is it not? And we are not done yet though...
4. That the Democratic party will faithfully abide by and uphold the principles laid down in the Kentucky and Virginia resolutions of 1792 and 1798, and in the report of Mr. Madison to the Virginia legislature in 1799; that it adopts these principles as constituting one of the main foundations of its political creed, and is resolved to carry them out in their obvious meaning and import.Translation: The Democratic Party embraced sedition. Even Madison eventually wised up and recognized how utterly illogical and stupid his involvement in that enterprise was. Jefferson never did except when he was president he expected an even greater fealty to his government than the Washington and Adams administrations{1} demanded of them. Again, got hypocrisy?
And that we may more distinctly meet the issue on which a sectional party, subsisting exclusively on slavery agitation, now relies to test the fidelity of the people, north and south, to the constitution and the Union—For the sake of economy, from that point on in the platform there were three additional numbered resolves, all of which specifically mentioned slavery or involved slavery and one of the final two resolutions which also dealt with slavery. Geez, more on slavery. But nah, it had nothing whatsoever to do with the Civil War and only "ignorant people" would claim otherwise right xxx? ;) There is more, let us look at the 1860 platform which as I said reaffirmed everything from the 1856 platform with a few more addendums:
2. Inasmuch as difference of opinion exists in the Democratic party as to the nature and extent of the powers of a Territorial Legislature, and as to the powers and duties of Congress, under the Constitution of the United States, over the institution of slavery within the Territories,But in the first part of the 1856 platform, they rejected a central bank which the very same Supreme Court they were now claiming to reverence had declared over forty years previously was constitutional.{2} So they laud the court on Dred Scott but explicitly reject it in areas where the Court had already settled constitutional questions decades ago. Again, got hypocrisy?
Resolved, That the Democratic party will abide by the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States upon these questions of Constitutional Law.
Resolved, That the enactments of the State Legislatures to defeat the faithful execution of the Fugitive Slave Law, are hostile in character, subversive of the Constitution, and revolutionary in their effect.Yeah, we do'nut want them blacks gettin' all edjucated and free.
It is with no small degree of chagrin that we take a jaded view of the lacuna in modern life of genuine dialogue. The latter when properly understood is both difficult and also potentially rewarding. Most definitely it is not aimless bantering or a series of monologues as much of what passes today for "dialogue" actually is. Instead, dialogue properly conceived and carried out contains a dynamic constituent to it.
As Catholics we are the beneficiaries of ancient truths which to some extent admit of variations in application depending on particular times, circumstances, etc. However, there are also core principles which do not admit of an expiration date and which sadly we see given little if any accounting these days in much of what passes for public discourse. The degree of ignorance of people (some of whom considering what they claim for themselves should know better) of fundamental principles of proper conduct is appalling. There are however two ways to deal with this. We can either curse the darkness or try and light a few candles. With this statement of joint principles as well as the dialogue to follow, we intend to aim at the second approach.
We have an interest both for ourselves individually as well as to assist the common good generally in handling this matter in accordance with principles that are at the core of how Catholics should conduct themselves when confronting another person with opposing views. But these are not principles which are strictly speaking matters of faith only. We believe faith and reason cannot contradict and that reason is a natural light given to us all by the Creator as one way we are made in His image. It is therefore a crime to denigrate reason the way many people do and sadly, not a few Catholics fall prey to this.
We intend in this dialogue to show a proper respect for the rigours of proper logic and reasoning while doing our best to set an example for others of how a dialogue should be conducted. We trust that readers will see if they are of good will that in the sources about to be cited, while of an authoritative character for Catholics, the principles being touched on are and should be by logical extension universal. For example, there should be a general principle of what is and is not a dialogue and how one is properly conducted. We intend to propose one in this thread which will serve as a point of reference for us in the following undertaking but which has an applicability which we believe is universal.
The ancient concept of dialogue was codified by Pope Paul VI in his inaugural encyclical letter as "[the] internal drive of charity which seeks expression in the external gift of charity" (Ecclesiam Suam). It therefore must have charity at its core which St. Paul declared was "patent, kind, not jealous, not pompous, not inflated, not rude, seeks not its own interests, is not quick tempered, kind, not jealous, not pompous, not inflated, does not brood over injury, does not rejoice in wrongdoing but rejoices with the truth." (cf. 1 Cor. xiii,4-6).
So if dialogue has at its core charity and all that term encompasses, this by logical extension means that the parties actually listen to one another. Clarifications if requested by one party are complied with by the other. If in the process, someone encounters a principle, an argument, an approach to something different than what they have seen before, it involves considering that information and seeking as far as possible to assimilate it into the matrix of their own view to the extent they can. It may even require modifying one's view either in part or wholly.
Dialogue is indeed all too rare today because it takes genuine effort and shuns the kinds of strawman caricatures, sound-bytes, etc. that play into what passes for much of modern discourse. Pope Paul noted that the following characteristics should accompany a dialogue and we note them here as principles that we will endeavour to follow at all times on the subject before us as much as any other.
First of all, dialogue requires by its very nature clarity or as Pope Paul noted "the dialogue demands that what is said should be intelligible" (Ecclesiam Suam 81). We will strive at all times to be intelligible to both each other as well as the readers of what we will present.
Second, dialogue requires a degree of humility because as Pope Paul noted "[i]t would indeed be a disgrace if our dialogue were marked by arrogance, the use of bared words or offensive bitterness. What gives it its authority is the fact that it affirms the truth, shares with others the gifts of charity, is itself an example of virtue, avoids peremptory language, makes no demands. It is peaceful, has no use for extreme methods, is patient under contradiction and inclines towards generosity" (Ecclesiam Suam 81).
We will certainly strive to persuade others to give consideration of our positions as they will be outlined. We will also in recognizing these principles not make a demand on each other or others -viewing what we will say and how we shall say it as either standing or falling on its own merits or lack thereof.
Third, dialogue requires a confidence by both parties "not only in the power of one's own words, but also in the good will of both parties to the dialogue" (Ecclesiam Suam 81). We expressly recognize in each other the good will to dialogue and would ask of those reviewing what we will present the same courtesy as well.
Fourthly, dialogue requires adaptation to the characteristics of the audience or "allowances for the psychological and moral circumstances of his hearer, (Mt 7.6.) particularly if he is a child, unprepared, suspicious or hostile" (Ecclesiam Suam 81). This is a difficult areas to navigate because people's understanding can vary significantly; we will however do our best which is all anyone can do really. Having noted the principles and procedures we intend to follow, a bit needs to be said on the subject of criticism itself.
Society today has an overly critical component to it that often seems to want to criticize as if the latter is an end in and of itself instead of a means to an end. Fundamentally and in principle, neither of us has a problem with criticism -indeed we intend to criticize the positions of the other on the subject in question. But we do not intend criticism for the sake of criticism as that is of no value. In a dialogue, criticism can suit a useful purpose to enable people to explain themselves better, to account for weaknesses in one's position, etc. and therefore be of a constructive nature. It can also give people cause to reassess their views and (in the words of Benjamin Franklin) "question a bit of their own infallibility."
We are both willing to consider the possibility that we may be wrong and indeed it would seem strange for us to expect either each other or anyone reading what we write to reconsider their views where ours may be different if we somehow were unwilling to do the same thing ourselves.
Another problem of modern life is the loss of a habit of mind that allows differentiation of arguments from quarrels with the result that disagreements or attempts at correction tend to be destructive rather than constructive. This is a trap we intend to avoid to the best of our abilities. [Excerpt from Rerum Novarum (circa August 10, 2008)]The above material can be viewed as a formalization of how I approach the subject of dialogue on all subjects now as it serves to weed out a lot of pretenders who merely talk about these matters but have no intention of actually engaging them in a rational and ethical manner.